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 ABSTRACT 
 
In my first essay, I find a statistically and economically significant director-specific 
component in CEO pay following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  In 
the cross-section of firms, directors that award relatively higher (lower) CEO pay in one firm 
also award relatively higher (lower) CEO pay in other firms of whose boards they are members 
during the year.  Based on my estimates, the director-specific component is responsible for 
around ±3.5% of total CEO pay or around ±$230,000 per CEO-year on average.  In addition to 
affecting CEO pay levels, the director-specific component also has a significant effect on the 
changes and the composition of CEO pay, thus affecting CEO incentives.  I pursue two potential 
explanations for our findings—changes in board composition and changes in director behavior 
after SOX.  I do not find evidence that the director-specific component in CEO pay is due to 
changes in board composition.  Instead, I find evidence that the director-specific component in 
CEO pay is due to changes in director behavior related to the additional risks and employment 
concerns imposed on directors after SOX.  My findings are consistent with the view that SOX 
discourages directors from taking risks when awarding CEO pay and so directors award CEO 
pay that they can more easily justify through direct experiences in other firms.  These findings 
have wide implications about the importance of directors in setting CEO pay, the existence of 
agency problems within the board, and the consequences of regulation in general and SOX in 
particular. 
ii 
 My second essay concerns the compensation of directors themselves.  I find that 
institutional ownership is positively related to the level of director compensation and the 
proportion of equity based compensation that directors receive. These results are consistent with 
the interpretation that institutions prefer stronger links between firm performance and board 
compensation and are willing to pay higher levels of compensation for better governance. I also 
investigate the difference between the effects of active versus passive institutional investment 
and find that active institutions appear to have a larger economic impact on director 
compensation. However, I do not find a statistical difference between the effects of active and 
passive ownership. 
My third essay studies the strategies that firms follow when apportioning incentive 
compensation within the board of directors.  Firms tend to preserve the structure of director 
incentives over time so that firms using equal (variable) incentives in one year are more likely to 
use equal (variable) incentives in the following year.  I further examine whether the structure of 
director incentives within the board affects acquirer performance in corporate acquisitions.  I find 
that the five-day announcement returns of firms awarding equal director incentives are around 
1% higher than the returns of firms that award variable director incentives within the board.  
These results are robust to standard controls related to acquirer returns, to different lengths of the 
announcement window, and to alternative incentive strategy classification schemes.  Overall, my 
findings are consistent with the idea that director incentives play a significant role in corporate 
performance and with the idea that equal director incentives dominate variable incentives in 
circumstances where the success of the outcome is likely to depend on the board as a whole. 
iii 
 For Jessica and Cass, without whom I would not be.
iv 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
For helpful comments and discussions I would like to thank Vladimir Atanasov, David Becher, 
Honghui Chen, Valentin Dimitrov, Melissa Frye, Vladamir Gatchev, Daniel Green, Paul Gregg,  
Michael Roberts, Robin Roberts, Charles Schnitzlein, Stephan Shipe, Geoffrey Turnbull, and 
seminar participants at the University of Central Florida, the 2014 Florida Finance Conference, 
the 2014 FMA annual meetings, the 2015 MFA conference, and the 2015 SWFA conference.  I 
remain responsible for any errors. 
v 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix 
ESSAY ONE: WHEN IN DOUBT - WHY IS THERE A DIRECTOR SPECIFIC 
COMPONENT IN CEO PAY AFTER SOX? ................................................................................ 1 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
2. What could explain a director-specific component in CEO pay? ........................................... 7 
3. Sample description .................................................................................................................. 9 
4. The director-specific component in CEO pay ....................................................................... 19 
5. Test for a wider network effect ............................................................................................. 27 
6. Board composition ................................................................................................................ 28 
7. Director risks and incentives ................................................................................................. 30 
8. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 33 
Appendix: Variable definitions ................................................................................................. 35 
References ................................................................................................................................. 36 
Figures and Tables .................................................................................................................... 39 
ESSAY TWO: WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN? DIRECTOR PAY AND 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ................................................................................................. 53 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 53 
2. Data ....................................................................................................................................... 58 
3. Results ................................................................................................................................... 61 
4. Instrumental Variable Estimation.......................................................................................... 64 
5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 66 
References ................................................................................................................................. 67 
Tables ........................................................................................................................................ 70 
ESSAY THREE: DOES IT MATTER HOW FIRMS APPORTION DIRECTOR INCENTIVES? 
EVIDENCE FROM ACQUISITIONS ......................................................................................... 75 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 75 
2. Sample ................................................................................................................................... 80 
3. Structure of Director Pay....................................................................................................... 82 
4. Acquisition Announcement Returns ..................................................................................... 87 
5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 92 
Appendix A: Example Firms..................................................................................................... 95 
vi 
 Appendix B: Variable Definitions............................................................................................. 97 
References ................................................................................................................................. 98 
Tables ........................................................................................................................................ 99 
vii 
 LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 - An example of director-linked firms ......................................................................... 39 
Figure 1.2 - The director-specific component in CEO pay ........................................................... 40 
viii 
 LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1 - Summary of variables ................................................................................................. 41 
Table 1.2 - The director-specific component in CEO pay ............................................................ 43 
Table 1.3 - The director-specific component for different specifications .................................... 46 
Table 1.4 - Tests for a wider network effect ................................................................................. 47 
Table 1.5 - Pre-SOX tests conditional on board composition ...................................................... 48 
Table 1.6 - Post-SOX tests conditional on director incentives ..................................................... 51 
Table 2.1 - Summary of variables ................................................................................................. 70 
Table 2.2 - Regression of total director pay .................................................................................. 71 
Table 2.3 - Regression of equity based compensation .................................................................. 72 
Table 2.4 - Test for ownership type .............................................................................................. 73 
Table 2.5 - Instrumental variable regression ................................................................................. 74 
Table 3.1 - Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................. 99 
Table 3.2 - Annual distribution of rank correlations firms with variable incentives .................. 103 
Table 3.3 - Comparison correlations for firms with variable incentives .................................... 104 
Table 3.4 - Contingency Analysis ............................................................................................... 105 
Table 3.5 - Test Sample Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................... 107 
Table 3.6 - Annual distribution of rank correlations for acquisitions by variable incentive firms
 ............................................................................................................................................. 111 
Table 3.7 - Comparison correlations for acquisitions by variable incentive firms ..................... 112 
Table 3.8 - Summary statistics for test sample ........................................................................... 113 
Table 3.9 - Regression Analysis - 5 Day Window...................................................................... 115 
Table 3.10 - Regression Analysis - 11 Day Window .................................................................. 117 
ix 
 ESSAY ONE: WHEN IN DOUBT - WHY IS THERE A DIRECTOR SPECIFIC 
COMPONENT IN CEO PAY AFTER SOX? 
 
1. Introduction 
There is little doubt that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and the accompanying 
changes in listing standards on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq, while 
changing the composition and the structure of corporate boards, also significantly increased the 
costs and risks to directors serving on the boards of public companies.  The new rules increased 
the disclosure requirements and the scrutiny on directors, imposed new responsibilities on 
directors to justify their decisions, and increased director personal liability and penalties if 
directors are found in violation of U.S. securities laws.1 
Yet financial researchers are still trying to develop a clear picture of whether and how 
directors have changed their behavior in response to the higher costs and risks after SOX.2  In 
this study, we use a novel approach to examine the determinants of CEO pay and present 
evidence consistent with directors attempting to avoid the increased costs and risks following 
SOX by awarding CEO pay that they can more easily justify through direct experiences on other 
boards. 
1 See, for example, Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008), Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2010), and the references therein.  
Consistent with an increase in director liability and penalties, Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) find that Director and 
Officer (D&O) insurance premiums have doubled after SOX. 
2 Consistent with numerous prior studies, we will use SOX to encompass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, SEC 
rules that implement SOX, and changes in NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards associated with SOX. 
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 Several considerations motivate our interest in CEO pay.  First, CEO pay was at the 
center of the 2001-2002 corporate governance scandals that lead to SOX.  In most of the 
scandals, CEOs and other executives had received substantial compensation prior to the 
collapses of their firms.3  The apparent discrepancy between the fortunes of executives and other 
stakeholders pointed to a link between executive pay and fraud and focused the attention of 
regulators, commentators, and academic researchers on executive pay.  For instance, in October 
2002, NYSE and Nasdaq proposed rules requiring shareholder approval of most equity-based 
compensation plans.4  Executive pay, especially CEO pay, is thus a highly visible aspect of 
corporate governance that is likely to be heavily scrutinized after SOX.  Moreover, scrutiny on 
how directors award CEO pay could be accompanied by additional scrutiny of other director 
duties.  Under these circumstances, directors would be especially sensitive to CEO pay and may 
change how they award CEO pay after SOX.  Second, the board of directors is the key decision-
maker when it comes to awarding CEO pay.  For other aspects of corporate behavior (e.g., 
investment and financial policies), decisions may be in the hands of managers as well as 
directors.  Examining CEO pay, therefore, allows us to reach direct conclusions about changes in 
the behavior of directors.  And third, because CEO actions could significantly affect firm value, 
understanding the determinants of CEO incentives in general, and CEO pay in particular, is 
important and is the subject of an active area of research. 
Using a sample of 12,188 firm-years between 1996 and 2011, we find that following the 
enactment of SOX there is a statistically and economically significant director-specific 
component in CEO pay; that is, after controlling for firm, CEO, and board characteristics known 
3 The most notorious of these scandals was the collapse of Enron.  In 2000, Enron’s then chairman and CEO 
received a total pay valued at around $30 million and additionally exercised options in excess of $124 million.  In 
contrast, in the ensuing bankruptcy, ordinary shareholders lost the bulk of their Enron investments, and thousands of 
Enron workers lost their jobs and much of their retirement savings. 
4 SEC approved these rules on June 30, 2003. 
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 to affect CEO pay, directors who award relatively higher (lower) CEO pay in one firm also 
award relatively higher (lower) CEO pay in the other firms of whose boards they are members 
during the year.  Based on our estimates, after 2002 around ±3.5% of total CEO pay, or around 
±$230,000 per CEO-year on average, is awarded as a consequence of this director-specific 
component.  Moreover, the director-specific component in CEO pay is also significant in the 
year-over-year changes in a CEO’s pay as well as in the proportion of a CEO’s equity-based pay.  
To the extent that pay changes and equity-based pay provide CEOs with incentives for 
performance (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990 and Core and Guay, 1999), the director-specific 
component in CEO pay significantly influences CEO performance incentives. 
In order to better understand the source of the documented director-specific component in 
CEO pay after SOX, we perform additional analysis.  For the sake of tractability, we group the 
potential explanations for our findings into two categories:  explanations based on changes in 
board composition and explanations based on changes in director behavior after SOX. 
Our findings do not support the explanation that the director-specific component in CEO 
pay is a consequence of the changes in board composition following SOX.  Specifically, we 
examine whether a director-specific component in CEO pay exists prior to SOX for a sub-sample 
of firms that even prior to 2002 satisfied the board independence requirements imposed by the 
new exchange listing standards.  We do not find evidence of a director-specific component in 
CEO pay before SOX in the sub-sample of firms that already satisfied the new standards or, for 
that matter, in the sub-sample of firms that did not satisfy these standards.  In similar tests, we 
examine whether the director-specific component in CEO pay exists prior to SOX for firms with 
larger boards, non-dual CEOs, low proportions of current executives, and high proportions of 
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 lawyers—i.e., boards that are similar in composition to post-SOX boards.5  We do not find 
evidence of a director-specific component in CEO pay in any of these sub-samples prior to SOX. 
To determine whether the director-specific component in CEO pay is related to increased 
director costs and risks after SOX, we examine whether the effect varies with director risk-taking 
incentives as measured by excess director option-based pay, expected director turnover, and 
director reputation concerns in the market for directors.  All else equal, if director option-based 
pay is low relative to expectations then directors are less likely to take on additional risks, 
including risks stemming from SOX.  Because director option-based pay is endogenous, we first 
estimate a model that explains director option-based pay.  Using the residuals from this model, 
we form two sub-samples based on whether director option-based pay is below-expectations or 
above-expectations.  We find that the director-specific component in CEO pay is more 
pronounced when director option-based pay is low relative to expectations.  In similar tests we 
find that the director-specific component in CEO pay is mostly evident when expected director 
turnover (as measured by the firm’s historic turnover) is relatively high and when directors have 
high reputation concerns (as measured by the number of boards a director serves).  Overall, our 
findings are consistent with the idea that, after SOX, directors with relatively low risk-taking 
incentives try to avoid taking risks by awarding similar CEO pay across the different boards they 
serve. 
Our study provides several notable contributions to the literature.  First, our study 
contributes to the standing question of whether CEO pay is mostly determined in the labor 
5 After SOX, board composition itself may have changed as a response to the increased costs and risks after SOX.  
For instance, as discussed by Linck, Netter, and Yang, (2008), the increase in lawyers and the reduction in current 
executives may be one such response.  Consistent with this reasoning, we find that the director-specific component 
in CEO pay is mostly evident for firms that have followed the general trend and have increased the proportion of 
lawyers and/or reduced the proportion of current executives in their boards.  In contrast, firms that have kept a high 
proportion of current executives and a low proportion of lawyers in their boards do not exhibit a significant director-
specific component in CEO pay.  
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 market for CEO talent (e.g., Rosen, 1990; Himmelberg and Hubbard, 2000; Hubbard, 2005; 
Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2008) or whether agency problems within the board may lead 
to CEO pay that reflects the preferences of directors (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen, 1993; Hall and Murphy, 2003; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).  Existing empirical research on 
the relevance of the board for CEO pay examines mainly the importance of board structure and 
composition.6  However, director costs and risks, while more difficult to observe, also play a 
central role in agency theory.  The exogenous shock to director costs and risks after SOX, 
therefore, provides a unique opportunity to examine whether and how CEO pay depends on the 
board of directors.7  Our findings are consistent with the predictions of agency theory where 
directors’ decisions on CEO pay are, at least in part, driven by directors’ own preferences. 
Second, our study contributes to the literature examining the effects of SOX and the 
accompanying changes in exchange listing requirements on corporate behavior.  For example, 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find a significant decrease in CEO pay in firms that are most 
affected by the new exchange requirements while Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2010) find that 
U.S. firms, when compared to non-U.S. firms, experience a decline in risk-taking after SOX as 
evidenced by a decline in capital and R&D expenditures, an increase in corporate cash holdings, 
and an overall decline in stock volatility.8  We present evidence of another, likely unintended, 
consequence of SOX that is consistent with the view that SOX discourages risk taking by 
directors. 
6 See, among others, Yermack (1996), Hallock (1997), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001), Grinstein and Hribar (2004), and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009). 
7 Other studies also use SOX as an exogenous event to examine the effect of outside directors on firm performance 
(Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010) and on CEO pay (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). 
8 Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan (2012) re-examine the results of Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and find that 
the majority of the decline in CEO pay after SOX is attributable to two outlier CEOs--Steve Jobs at Apple and Kosta 
Kartsotis at Fossil.  Dey (2010) questions the interpretation of Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2010) that the decline in 
risk-taking of U.S. firms is due to SOX and instead suggests that general market trends may be behind their findings. 
5 
                                                          
 Third, the findings have more general implications about regulating the internal 
governance of firms.  Because regulation is usually intended to change the incentives of those 
being regulated, it is important to better understand what incentives exactly are being changed.  
The substantive corporate governance regulations imposed by SOX are unprecedented in the 
history of federal securities regulation, which provides a unique opportunity to examine the 
effects of such regulations on corporate behavior.  The lessons learned from SOX indicate that 
increasing the costs and risks of internal governance, instead of resolving agency problems, may 
in fact exacerbate them.9 
Finally, our study also contributes to the literature on the existence of “styles” in 
corporate decisions.  Most notably, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) track top managers over time as 
they manage different firms and provide evidence for manager fixed effects for a wide range of 
corporate decisions.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003) contribute these findings to heterogeneity in 
manager “styles”.  Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) propose two distinct hypotheses for the 
findings of Bertrand and Schoar (2003): (i) the idiosyncratic style hypothesis, according to which 
unanticipated managerial-style effects cause firm policies and (ii) the selected style hypothesis, 
according to which directors deliberately select a manager “style” to induce the firm to move in a 
certain direction.  Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) present evidence consistent with the selected 
style hypothesis but inconsistent with the idiosyncratic style hypothesis.  Our findings raise 
another possibility: the evidence of “styles” may be contextual and may not reflect the existence 
of actual “styles”.  Specifically, directors may not have their own “styles” in awarding CEO pay, 
yet in an attempt to reduce the risk of being scrutinized, directors may tend to award similar CEO 
9 The objective of this study is not to provide a complete cost-benefit analysis of SOX.  Zhang (2007), for example, 
studies the overall economic consequence of SOX and finds that U.S. firms experienced a statistically significant 
negative cumulative abnormal return around key SOX events. 
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 pay across all boards they serve.  In this case the heterogeneity across directors is due to directors 
serving on different boards and not due to differences in actual “styles”. 
Our paper is somewhat related to studies that examine the effect of peer groups on CEO 
pay (e.g., Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen, 2008; Albuquerque, 2009) and studies that examine 
network effects in corporate governance (e.g., Bouwman, 2011).  While existing studies on peer 
group effects use mainly industry- and size-based peer groups, our study explicitly accounts for 
industry and size effects and focuses on the importance of specific directors in determining CEO 
pay.10  In addition, we demonstrate that our findings are not driven by a wider network of 
directors sharing information about optimal CEO pay but instead are isolated to the one director 
who serves on several boards. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 proposes and motivates 
two explanations for the director-specific component in CEO pay after SOX.  Section 3 describes 
our sample and variables.  Section 4 presents our main findings for a director-specific component 
in CEO pay.  Section 5 examines whether our findings are due to a wider network effect while 
Section 6 examines whether our findings are due to changes in board composition.  Section 7 
examines how director risks affect the director-specific component in CEO pay.  Section 8 
concludes the paper. 
2. What could explain a director-specific component in CEO pay? 
Existing theoretical and empirical research on the determinants of executive 
compensation has ignored the possibility that a director-specific component may affect CEO pay.  
10 Moreover, most directors who serve on multiple boards serve on boards across different industries.  This fact also 
makes it highly unlikely that our findings are a result of industry peer effects.  Our findings may indicate that post-
SOX directors choose peer groups from the set of firms on whose boards they sit.  This interpretation of the results 
relies on endogenously chosen peer groups and is still consistent with our overall conclusion of a director-specific 
component in CEO pay after SOX. 
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 Under optimal contracting, CEO pay is determined by the characteristics of the firm, the 
information environment, the competition for human capital among firms, the competition for 
jobs among CEOs, and the abilities and risk-preferences of the CEO so that equilibrium CEO 
pay does not depend on who awards the pay.  Even in settings where CEO compensation 
depends on the governance of the firm, and thus on the board of directors, board and director 
characteristics are considered to be confined within each firm so that a director-specific 
component would not manifest itself across different firms.11  In this section we propose and 
motivate two possible explanations for a director-specific component in CEO pay after SOX. 
2.1 Changes in board composition 
Different directors may have different bargaining skills, different assessments of what 
constitutes optimal CEO pay or simply different “styles” when awarding CEO pay.  Such 
differences across directors may lead to a director-specific component in CEO pay but only if 
directors are the ones who set the pay of the CEO.  Existing studies conducted prior to SOX, 
however, present evidence that CEO pay may effectively be set by the CEO and not by the board 
(see Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002, and Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 for the 
“managerial power” and “skimming” hypotheses). 
After the enactment of SOX, there is an increase in board size, board independence, and 
the proportion of lawyers in the board and a decrease in CEO duality and the proportion of 
current executives on the board (Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008).12  All of these changes provide 
a strong indication that, after SOX, boards have become more independent from the CEO of the 
firm.  It is, therefore, possible that our findings of a director-specific component in CEO pay 
11 A comprehensive review of the literature on executive compensation is beyond the scope of this study.  For a 
review of the literature, the reader is referred to Murphy (1999) and Aggarwal (2008) and the references therein. 
12 The increase in board size seems to be a consequence of firms hiring new outside directors to satisfy the new 
requirements while not letting go of insiders (see, Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008). 
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 after SOX are due to the changes in board composition following SOX and are simply an 
indication that before SOX directors had less influence on CEO pay than after SOX. 
2.2 Changes in board behavior 
Director behavior also may have changed in response to changes in director costs and 
risks after SOX.  Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) find that boards meet more often after SOX and 
that Director and Officer (D&O) insurance premiums have doubled, findings that are consistent 
with an increase in director costs and risks.  In addition, Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) find that 
director turnover has increased after SOX.  Because relatively higher turnover means relatively 
lower job security and because director dismissal would likely have an adverse effect on director 
reputational capital, an increase in director turnover also points to an increase in director risks 
after SOX. 
Overall, when considering CEO pay after SOX, directors concerned with their own 
welfare would prefer CEO pay that minimizes these additional costs and risks.  Such concerns 
may lead to a director-specific component in CEO pay in at least two ways.  First, to reduce 
exposure to the higher risks after SOX, directors may award CEO pay that they find relatively 
easy to justify through direct experiences on other boards.  Second, if different directors have 
different assessments of or sensitivities to the additional costs and risks stemming from SOX, 
then a director-specific component in CEO pay may emerge, i.e., directors less (more) sensitive 
to these costs and risk would tend to award higher (lower) CEO pay. 
3. Sample description 
In this section we describe the data, define the main variables, and provide summary 
statistics for the sample of firms used in the study.  Of special interest is the construction of the 
variable that we use to measure the director-specific component in CEO pay. 
9 
 3.1 Data 
The main sample for this study is an intersection of Compustat’s Execucomp database 
and RiskMetrics Director and Governance data.  Starting from 1992, Execucomp provides 
detailed executive compensation data mainly for firms in the S&P 1500 index.  The CEO 
compensation data is matched with RiskMetrics Director and Governance data which provides 
director data for firms in the S&P 1500 index beginning in 1996.  As a result, our base sample 
consists of firms publicly traded between 1996 and 2011. 
To form the final dataset used in our analysis, we obtain additional firm data from the 
Compustat annual files, the CRSP monthly files, and Thomson Reuters’ CDA/Spectrum 
Institutional Holdings files.   The sample is restricted to firm-years with CEOs for whom we 
have a complete set of components comprising the total compensation variable in Execucomp 
(tdc1).13  If the net value of the sum of all components is not within $1,000 of the reported total 
compensation, then the observation is dropped from our sample.  To eliminate spurious effects 
that CEO turnover may have on observed CEO pay, we also remove from our sample any firm-
years where the CEO left office during the fiscal year.  Furthermore, when examining changes in 
CEO pay, we ensure that the year t-1 CEO and the year t CEO is the same person.  CEO 
compensation and all other dollar figures are adjusted for inflation with Consumer Price Index 
data from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, with 2012 as the base year. 
Our starting sample consists of 17,395 firm-year observations with available data in both 
the Riskmetrics and the Execucomp databases.  Additional data requirements from CRSP and 
Compustat reduce the sample size to 14,987 firm-years.  For 2,799 of these observations, firms 
13 Prior to December 2006, tdc1 was defined as the sum of salary, bonus, rstkgrnt, ltip, option_awards_blk_value, 
othann, and allothtot.  After December 2006, tdc1 is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, noneq_incent 
stock_awards_fv, option_awards_fv, and othcomp.  These changes came as a result of the 2004 revision of FASB 
FAS 123. 
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 do not share directors with other firms within the same year and so we are unable to calculate our 
measure of director-linked CEO pay.  The final sample thus consists of 12,188 firm-year 
observations (2,056 unique firms) between 1996 and 2011 with an average of around 762 firms 
per year.  The sample is fairly balanced over time, with a minimum of 607 firms in 1996 and a 
maximum of 937 firms in 2011. 
3.2 Measuring director-specific CEO pay 
To test for a director-specific component in CEO pay, we examine how the pay that 
directors award to the CEO of one firm is related to the CEO pay of other firms on whose boards 
these same directors serve.14  Our general approach is similar to the approach employed by 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and in Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) to examine how a CEO’s 
style at the new employer relates to the style of the same CEO at her previous employer.  Our 
analysis is not based on director fixed effects (another approach used in Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003) for two critical reasons.  First, Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) present significant 
evidence of serious underlying methodological difficulties in using dummy variables to identify 
CEO-specific effects, difficulties that would also be present when examining director-specific 
effects.  And second, by construct director-fixed effects are constant over time and forward-
looking from the standpoint of a given year.  However, when trying to justify CEO pay in a 
given year directors would be most interested in the pay of other CEOs during the same year 
since such pay is directly observed and most likely to be used as a comparison.  Conceptually, 
whereas director-fixed effects may help capture heterogeneity in unobserved (or latent) director-
specific styles in awarding CEO pay, our focus is on CEO pay that directors can more easily 
14 As a source of information, directors may also want to use CEO pay in firms on whose boards they do not serve.  
However, fiduciary duties, boardroom confidentiality policies, insider trading laws, and verification frictions may 
prevent directors from sharing and learning about contemporaneous CEO pay in these firms before CEO pay is 
publicly disclosed. 
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 justify and in that sense using observed contemporaneous CEO pay dominates using unobserved 
director-fixed effects. 
Specifically, for each firm-year observation, we form a sample of director-linked firms 
consisting of all other firms in our dataset that share board members with the base firm during 
the fiscal year.  The sample of director-linked firms contains one observation for each board 
member link, so a firm may be represented multiple times in the case of interlocking boards (i.e., 
more than one shared board member with the base firm).  Taking an average of the CEOs’ total 
pay within this director-linked sample of firms gives us a measure of director-linked CEO pay 
for each firm-year.  Figure 1.1 presents a simple example for the identification of director-linked 
firms. 
The measure of director-linked CEO pay is in effect the average level of compensation a 
board pays to other CEOs when its members serve on other boards during the fiscal year.  For a 
mathematical representation, consider a market with I  firms and J  directors who may be 
shared by any of the firms.  We define director-linked CEO compensation for any firm i  in year 
t , ,
dl
i tC , as equal to: 
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In this specification, ',i tC  is the log total CEO compensation for firm 'i  in year t , 
', 1j i i tD ∈ ∩ =  if firm i  and firm 'i  share director j  in year t , and  ', 0j i i tD ∈ ∩ =  otherwise.15 
15 As we discuss in more detail in Section 3.4, our final variable of director-linked CEO pay is standardized within 
each sub-sample where sub-samples are based on the number of director-linked observations used to calculate the 
average director-linked CEO pay.  This adjustment does not affect our findings yet it is necessary since our measure 
of director-linked CEO pay is an average and thus its variance is directly affected by the number of director-linked 
firms used to calculate that average.   
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 The pay of the CEO in each firm depends on many factors, such as firm size and other 
firm characteristics as well as CEO and board characteristics.  To construct a measure of 
director-specific CEO pay, we decompose director-linked CEO pay into two components.  The 
first component is the director-linked CEO pay that is predicted by the firm, CEO, and board 
characteristics of linked firms.  The second component is the director-linked CEO pay not 
predicted by these variables (i.e., the residual), which we use to measure director-specific CEO 
pay.  For this purpose, we estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model: 
 , , , ,3 -      i t i t i t i tC X digit SIC code year fixed effectsβ ν= + × + . (2) 
In Equation (2), ,i tC  is the log total compensation of the CEO of firm i for year t.  As 
explanatory variables ( ,i tX ), we include all firm, CEO, and board characteristics used in the 
previous analysis. 
The model in Equation (2) is estimated using all 14,987 firm-year observations in our 
base sample, even firm-year observations where no director is a member of other boards.  The 
estimates from the model based on the larger sample are indistinguishable from the estimates 
presented in Table 1.2, discussed later in the paper.  Based on the estimates, for each firm-year 
we compute the residual component of CEO compensation ( ,i tν ) and the component predicted by 
all regressors ( , , ,ˆi t i t i tC C ν= − ).  Note that by construction the two components are independent 
from each other.  By applying Equation (1) separately to ,ˆi tC  and to ,i tν , we effectively 
decompose director-linked CEO pay into its predicted and residual components ( ,ˆ
dl
i tC  and ,
dl
i tν ).  
Due to the linearity of all relevant calculations, the two components add up to the director-linked 
CEO pay variable ( , , ,ˆ
dl dl dl
i t i t i tC C ν= + ).  While in the subsequent analysis we examine whether and 
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 how CEO pay is related to both components of director-linked CEO pay ( ,ˆ
dl
i tC  and ,
dl
i tν ), our 
primary focus is on the measure of director-specific CEO pay ( ,
dl
i tν ). 
3.3 Control variables 
In the analysis that follows, we use a range of control variables that measure various firm, 
CEO, and board characteristics.  Numerous studies on executive compensation find that CEO 
compensation is positively related to firm size (see, for example, Gabaix and Landier, 2008; 
Terviö, 2008; Frydman and Saks, 2010; and the references therein).  We follow Gabaix and 
Landier (2008) and measure firm size as the sum of the book value of debt and market value of 
equity at the end of the prior fiscal year.16 
Studies of executive compensation and its sensitivity to performance traditionally use 
annual stock returns to capture firm performance (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 1999), where stock returns directly affect the value of CEO stock and option holdings 
as well as the likelihood of receiving bonuses.  Annual returns for each firm are calculated for 
the prior fiscal year using data from the CRSP monthly files.  To calculate annual returns, we 
require at least nine monthly return observations, and firm-years with fewer than nine return 
observations are dropped from the sample.  In consideration of the effect that accounting 
performance may have on executive compensation (Murphy, 2001), we further calculate and 
include in our analysis the return on assets (ROA) for each firm-year. 
Because firm risk may affect a CEO’s compensation contract and value (Agrawal and 
Mandelker, 1987; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006), we also include a measure of firm risk that 
is calculated as the variance of monthly stock returns for the five-year window ending before the 
16 See the Appendix for a detailed description of all variables used in the paper. 
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 start of the fiscal year.  When calculating the variance of stock returns, we restrict the sample to 
only those firm-years with at least 48 monthly stock return observations during the previous five 
years. 
Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (1999) find that CEO compensation contracts may be 
influenced by the opportunity set of the firm as well as by other factors related to firm 
uncertainty.  To further control for growth opportunities and firm uncertainty, in our regressions 
we include the book-to-market ratio of the firm (total assets divided by firm market value), 
leverage (long-term debt divided by total assets), and firm age (years since a firm’s first record 
on CRSP). 
Weak corporate governance structures may allow a CEO to extract higher levels of 
compensation from the firm.  A large body of literature is dedicated to the study of corporate 
governance and its effects on compensation (see, for example, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 
2002; and Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 for the “managerial power” and “skimming” 
hypotheses).  We include the entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) for 
each firm to account for CEO power over the board.  In addition, institutional investors may 
provide some governance through monitoring and activism (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Hartzell 
and Starks, 2003), therefore, we include the percentage of stock held by institutional investors as 
a control variable in our empirical estimations. 
CEO-specific characteristics may also play a role in determining the CEO’s 
compensation contract.  In assignment models, such as the ones developed by Gabaix and 
Landier (2008) and by Terviö (2008), the most skilled managers are matched to the largest firms 
and earn the highest pay, in part due to their better skills.  We include several variables that 
measure CEO characteristics, specifically the CEO’s age, the CEO’s tenure within the firm, and 
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 the CEO’s total record as a manager.  The age of the CEO is provided in Execucomp.  Firm-
specific tenure is calculated as the distance in years between the fiscal year end date and the hire 
date for the CEO at that firm.  The CEO’s record is the number of years Execucomp reports 
compensation for the CEO, independent of firm or position.  The CEO record variable is 
intended to measure the amount of information available to the market about the CEO’s skill 
level.  If availability of information about CEO skill influences CEO pay, past executive 
experience at other levels and with other firms may also influence compensation level and 
structure.17  We also include a measure of CEO firm ownership, because higher ownership 
results in better incentive alignment of the CEO with the owners of the firm and thus may affect 
the level and composition of CEO compensation. 
As additional variables relevant for the compensation of the CEO we include several 
board characteristics.  Shivsdasani (1993) finds that board ownership of the firm decreases the 
likelihood that a firm is the target of a hostile takeover and concludes that higher levels of board 
ownership serve as a positive governance mechanism.  Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) 
find that CEO compensation is increasing in board size.  They also find that board busyness 
(directors serving on multiple boards) leads to higher levels of CEO compensation, although 
other studies have yielded mixed results on the effects of board busyness on CEO pay (e.g., 
Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Perry and Peyer, 2005).  In 
addition to board ownership and board busyness, we account for the industry focus of each 
board.  Board industry focus represents the proportion of director-linked firms that are in the 
same industry as the base firm, where industries are defined at the level of three-digit SIC codes. 
17 The CEO record variable may also measure the prior experience of the CEO.  If there is a higher demand for prior 
experience, that would lead to a higher CEO pay. 
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 All of our empirical tests adjust for year-industry effects by subtracting the year-industry 
mean of each variable, where industries are defined at the level of three-digit SIC codes.  We 
note that our analysis thus accounts for industry fixed effects that are allowed to vary every year, 
an approach that is more conservative than the traditional approach of two separate additive 
effects, one for the year and the other for the industry, where industry effects are not allowed to 
vary over time.  If directors tend to participate in boards in the same industry, this more 
conservative approach may bias our tests against finding evidence of a director-specific 
component in CEO compensation even if such an effect may in fact exist.  However, the more 
conservative approach allows us to more rigorously control for the effects that industry peers 
have on CEO compensation, as documented by Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008) and 
Albuquerque (2009). 
3.4 Summary statistics 
Panel A of Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis.  As 
shown in Table 1.1, our final sample consists of 12,188 firm-year observations and spans the 
period from 1996 to 2011.  The median firm in our sample has a market value of $4.77 billion in 
2012 dollars with a median annual stock return of 11.97%.  The median CEO earns a total pay of 
$4.09 million, is 56 years old, and has been a CEO at the current firm for six years.  The median 
director-linked CEO pay in our sample is $5.06 million. 
Boards have a median of ten members, and directors hold 1.4 board seats on average.  
The number of board seats does not show a strong tendency to be held within the same industry.  
For directors with multiple board appointments, the median firm has no directors that serve on 
other boards in the same industry, and on average only 5% of directors serve on multiple boards 
in the same industry, where industries are defined at the level of three-digit SIC codes.  The low 
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 industry focus of directors is notable as it suggests that any potential director-specific component 
in CEO pay is unlikely to be related to a possible industry peer effect in CEO compensation. 
Panel B of Table 1.1 presents the number of firm-year observations and the mean and 
standard deviation of director-linked CEO pay conditional on the number of other firms to which 
directors are linked.  The table also presents the mean and standard deviation of the predicted 
and the residual director-linked CEO pay.  From a total of 12,188 firm-year observations, 2,610 
(or around 20%) have exactly one director who is a member of another board in our sample.  The 
occurrence of linked directors declines by around 20% per additional director-linked firm.  Yet 
for around 37% of the firm-years, director-linked CEO pay is based on at least five linked firms. 
The mean director-linked CEO pay increases mostly monotonically with the number of 
linked firms used to calculate director-linked CEO pay.  This feature of the variable is tied to 
firm size, as larger firms are more likely to have larger boards and to have directors who serve on 
external boards.  Director-linked CEO pay is an average and its standard deviation decreases, 
also mostly monotonically, with the number of linked firms.  This is true for the actual, 
predicted, and residual CEO pay.  To adjust for these trends in the data, we standardize all 
measures of director-linked CEO pay within each group defined by the number of director-linked 
firms.  Firms with 20 or more director-linked firms are grouped together.18  For example, for 
boards with eight linked firms, from the actual director-linked CEO pay we subtract the mean of 
1.830 and divide by the standard deviation of 0.444.  This adjustment ensures that the 
distribution of director-linked CEO pay is not driven by the number of linked firms used in the 
calculation of the variable.  While this adjustment leads to more accurate interpretation of the 
estimates (especially for interaction effects), our findings are not sensitive to the adjustment. 
18 Moving this upper grouping cut off to 25 director-linked firms does not change our findings. 
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 4. The director-specific component in CEO pay 
4.1 The level of CEO pay 
This section focuses on the main objective of the paper and examine whether there is a 
director-specific component in CEO pay before and after SOX.  For that purpose, we estimate 
regression models where the dependent variable is total CEO pay and as the main explanatory 
variable of interest we use the residual component of director-linked CEO pay.  In the following 
section we further estimate models in which the dependent variable is the change in CEO pay.  
All models include additional controls for firm, CEO, and board characteristics.  Furthermore, to 
account for year-industry effects, all dependent and independent variables are demeaned at the 
year-industry level, where industries are defined at the level of three-digit SIC codes.19 
Panel A of Table 1.2 reports the estimates from these regressions.  We estimate the 
regression models separately for the period before Sarbanes-Oxley (1996-2001) and for the 
period after Sarbanes-Oxley (2003-2011) while excluding 2002, the year in which Sarbanes-
Oxley was passed.  There is no significant relation between residual director-linked CEO pay 
and CEO pay prior to 2002.  However, after 2002, we find a highly significant and positive 
relation between residual director-linked CEO pay and CEO pay.  The estimated coefficient on 
the residual director-linked CEO pay is equal to 0.049 and has a p-value of 0.001.  For further 
interpretation of the coefficient estimates, Table 1.2 also reports the scaled coefficients for each 
explanatory variable, where scaled coefficients are calculated by multiplying the coefficient by 
the standard deviation of the respective explanatory variable.  We should note that while the 
director-linked CEO pay variables are standardized conditional on the number of director-linked 
19 Our findings are not substantially affected by the definition of industries.  We find similar results when we define 
industries at the level of two-digit SIC codes and when we define industries based on the 48 industries of Fama and 
French (1997). 
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 firms, their standard deviations are not necessarily equal to 1.0 for sub-samples based on, for 
instance, different time periods.  Based on the scaled coefficient, we find that a one standard 
deviation increase (decrease) in residual director-linked CEO pay leads to an approximately 
4.6% increase (decrease) in total CEO pay.20 
The above findings show that there is a statistically and economically significant director-
specific component in CEO pay after SOX.  But how much of a CEO’s pay is awarded as a 
direct consequence of the director-specific component?  To answer this question we compare the 
actual pay of each CEO in our post-SOX sample to the pay the same CEO would have received 
if there were no director-specific component in CEO pay.  We calculate the pay that a CEO 
would have received without a director-specific component ( *,i tCEO pay ) as follows: 
 ,
0.049*
, ,
i tResidual director-linked CEO pay
i t i tCEO pay Actual CEO pay e
− ×= ×   (3) 
This calculation is based on the assumption that without a director-specific component in 
CEO pay the coefficient on the residual director-linked CEO pay would equal zero while all 
other coefficients and the residual term would remain unchanged.  For each firm-year after SOX 
we then compute the absolute value of the difference between a CEO’s actual pay and a CEO’s 
pay without the director-specific component, i.e., *, ,i t i tActual CEO pay CEO pay− .  We find that 
on average around ±$230,000 of a CEO’s pay is awarded as a consequence of the director-
specific component in CEO pay.  Scaling the dollar amount by total CEO pay, we find that on 
average around ±3.5% of CEO pay is director-specific.21  Given that our post-SOX sample 
contains 7,278 firms, we find that, between 2003 and 2011, around ±$1.7 billion has been 
20 To examine the sensitivity of our findings to influential observations, in additional tests we re-estimate our model 
while excluding 538 firm-year observations with a Cook’s D statistic greater than 4/N where N is the total number 
of observations.  We obtain a similar estimate (around 0.04) that is significant at the 0.01 level. 
21 Due to the skewness of CEO pay, the medians are somewhat lower with the median firm awarding around 
±$110,000 or ±2.3% of CEO pay as a consequence of the director-specific component in pay. 
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 awarded as a consequence of the tendency of directors to award similar CEO pay across the 
different firms they serve. 
The component of director-linked CEO pay predicted by firm, CEO, and director 
characteristics also has a significantly positive effect on CEO pay.  Moreover, the positive effect 
is similar over time so that the scaled coefficient is around 0.022 (p-value of 0.046) before 2002 
and is around 0.026 (p-value of 0.008) after 2002.  The positive coefficient on the predicted 
director-linked CEO pay may be a result of several factors.  For example, it is possible that CEO 
pay in one firm directly affects CEO pay in other firms because of competition for the CEO’s 
human capital.  Current CEOs could potentially be hired as CEOs in other firms and, when 
directors know the CEO directly, they may be more inclined to hire the CEO due to lower 
asymmetric information.22  It is also possible that the characteristics of other firms sharing 
directors provide a better measure of optimal CEO pay simply because they also provide 
information about the firm above and beyond the firm’s own characteristics. 
In an attempt to distinguish between these two possibilities we test whether CEO 
compensation in one firm directly affects CEO compensation in other firms using an approach 
similar to the one employed by Leary and Roberts (2014).  In their paper, Leary and Roberts 
(2014) examine whether firms’ capital structures are influenced by the capital structure of 
industry peer firms.  As an exogenous shock to peer firm capital structure, Leary and Roberts 
(2014) use the stock returns of peer firms.  Following a similar approach, as an instrumental 
variable of director-linked CEO pay in our setting we use the stock return of director-linked 
22 In the dual scaling model of Gabaix and Landier (2008), the size of the reference firm also affects total CEO pay.  
Existing research provides evidence that CEO talent has a significant effect on firm performance (Kaplan, Klebanov, 
and Sorensen, 2012) and that firms compete for CEOs with general CEO talent (Rosen 1981; Murphy and Zabojnik, 
2004; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2008).  Existing research indicates that this consideration may be even 
more relevant in more recent years.  For example, Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) find that CEO hires with prior CEO 
experience in a publicly traded company have increased from less than 20% of all external hires in the 1970s to 
nearly 50% of external hires in the 1990s. 
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 firms for year t-1.  Based on our previous tests, year t-1 stock returns are significantly positively 
related to CEO pay in year t.  Using this instrumental variable approach, we do not find a 
significant relation between the returns of director-linked firms and CEO pay.  Based on these 
findings, we do not find evidence that the positive relation between CEO pay and the predicted 
portion of director-linked CEO pay is a consequence of the compensation of one CEO directly 
affecting the compensation of another director-linked CEO. 
When examining the rest of the explanatory variables we find that, consistent with the 
numerous previous studies on CEO compensation, market value is the most relevant predictor of 
CEO compensation.  Furthermore, higher annual returns on the firm’s stock predict higher CEO 
compensation levels, as do higher levels of institutional ownership and higher levels of CEO 
entrenchment (but only after 2002).  We also find that board size has a large positive effect on 
CEO pay, although this result becomes statistically insignificant during the latter period of the 
sample, possibly as a consequence of SOX.  Other board characteristics such as busyness and 
industry focus also show significant positive influence on compensation after 2002.  The only 
variable in our regression with a significantly negative effect on CEO compensation is CEO 
ownership, a finding consistent with the idea that CEO pay is used to provide CEOs with 
incentives for performance and that, when CEO ownership is already relatively high, the need for 
additional incentives is lower. 
To further examine the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate the model of Table 1.2 
separately for each year.  Figure 1.2 plots the annual coefficient estimates on director-linked 
CEO pay (Panel A) and on the residual portion of director-linked CEO pay (Panel B).  The figure 
further plots the 90th (bars) and the 95th (whiskers) of the estimated coefficients. 
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 As Panel A of Figure 1.2 shows, director-linked CEO pay is positively and significantly 
related to CEO pay mainly after 2002.  In contrast, for the six years prior to 2002, the coefficient 
on total director-linked CEO pay is mostly insignificant.  Examining the coefficient on the 
residual component of director-linked CEO pay (Panel B of Figure 1.2) we find similar results.  
Overall, in all but one (2007) of the nine years after 2002, we find evidence of a significant 
director-specific component in CEO pay.23  For the six years prior to 2002, the coefficient on the 
residual component of director-linked CEO pay is positive and significant in two years (1997 and 
1998), negative and significant in one year (1999), and insignificant in the other three years. 
This section presents significant and robust evidence that after adoption of SOX, 
directors tend to award similar CEO compensation across all firms of whose boards they are 
members, leading to a director-specific component in CEO pay.  With the exception of 2007, the 
director-specific component in CEO pay is present in every year after SOX.  Our estimates 
indicate that there is approximately a 4.6% increase (decrease) in CEO pay for every one 
standard deviation increase (decrease) in CEO pay that directors award in other firms they serve. 
4.2 Changes in CEO pay 
In this section we further test the relation between director-linked CEO pay and total 
CEO pay by examining the changes in CEO pay.  Panel B of Table 1.2 reports the results of a 
regression of the annual change in total CEO pay on covariates containing the year-over-year 
changes in the independent variables as well as the one year lags of those variables.  We make 
sure that the change in CEO pay is measured for the same CEO.  When we examine changes in 
23 However, in Section 7 we present some evidence that even in 2007 the director-specific component in CEO pay is 
similar to the effect in the rest of the years after SOX but only for a sub-sample of firms with relatively low director 
option-based pay.  
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 CEO pay, the sample size is reduced to 8,442 firm-years, as annual changes of CEO pay are not 
available for all firm-years. 
We find a positive and significant (at the 0.05 level) relation between the change in total 
CEO pay and the change in the residual component of director-linked CEO pay for the 2003-
2011 period of our sample.  Examining the scaled coefficients, a one standard deviation increase 
in the change in residual director-linked CEO pay leads to around 2.7% increase in CEO pay.  As 
a comparison, the scaled coefficient for firm size implies that a one standard deviation increase 
in the change in firm size leads to an increase in CEO pay of around 4.8% (p-value of 0.061).  
Therefore, the director-specific component in CEO pay has a relatively high economic 
significance.  In contrast, the change in the predicted portion of director-linked CEO pay is not 
significantly related to the change in CEO pay, with a scaled coefficient equal to –0.002 (p-value 
of 0.869).  This lack of significance suggests that the positive relation between the predicted 
portion of director-linked CEO pay and the level of CEO pay (discussed in Panel A of Table 1.2 
in the previous section) may be due to an omitted firm-specific variable that affects CEO pay for 
firms sharing directors, a possibility that we further investigate in subsequent tests. 
The relations between the change in CEO pay and the two components of lagged 
director-linked CEO pay are consistent with our previous conclusions.  The past level of the 
residual portion of director-linked CEO pay positively affects the change in CEO pay for the 
2004-2011 period and is highly significant (p-value of 0.01) while the predicted portion of 
lagged director-linked CEO pay is not significantly related to CEO pay.  These findings confirm 
our previous conclusions that, after the enactment of SOX, directors tend to award similar CEO 
pay across the different boards they serve. 
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 In additional analysis, we perform similar tests to examine the composition of CEO pay 
packages granted by the board, specifically the proportion of CEO equity-based pay.  For each 
firm-year, we calculate CEO stock-based pay as the proportion of the dollar values of restricted 
stock and option grants relative to total CEO compensation.  We then form a director-linked 
average of CEO stock-based pay using the same methodology as for the measure of director-
linked total CEO pay.  Because the proportion of stock-based pay to total pay is inherently 
bounded between zero and one, to obtain an unbounded measure of CEO stock-based pay we use 
a logit transform of the average director-linked CEO stock-based pay.24  We again find 
significant evidence for a director-specific component in CEO equity based pay after SOX.  The 
director-specific component in CEO equity-based pay does not appear to be distinct from the 
director-specific component in total CEO pay, which may not be surprising given that the main 
variation in CEO pay comes from the variation in stock-based and option-based pay.  Regardless 
of whether the two effects have the same source, a director-specific component in CEO stock-
based pay would significantly affect CEO incentives. 
4.3 Alternative specifications 
Our findings so far suggest the existence of a linkage between CEO pay of firms that 
share directors, a linkage that appears due to a director-specific component in CEO pay.  In 
effect, a director-specific component in CEO pay means that, even after accounting for firm, 
CEO and overall board characteristics, some directors tend to award relatively lower CEO pay 
while other directors tend to award relatively higher CEO pay.  It is possible that firms sharing a 
director also share a common factor that is unobserved yet affects the firms’ CEO pay.  If the 
24 The logit transform is ( ) ( )( )logit ln 1x x x= − .  Palia (2001) uses a similar approach to transform CEO pay-
performance sensitivity. 
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 explanatory variables do not fully control for that unobserved factor, then CEO pay in one firm 
may contain information about the unobserved factor and thus be correlated with CEO pay in all 
other firms sharing directors. 
To investigate the possibility that a common factor may be at the root of our findings, 
Table 1.3 presents results from two additional tests—the first test further accounts for geographic 
location fixed effects while the second test accounts for firm fixed effects.25  For ease of 
comparison, Table 1.3 again reports the scaled coefficient estimates from the base model.  All 
models control for all variables as in Table 1.2, including year-industry effects; however, to 
preserve space the table does not report the estimated coefficients of these variables. 
One common factor across director-linked firms could be the geographic location of 
firms.  If directors tend to serve on boards of firms that are relatively close to each other 
geographically, then variations in CEO compensation across different locations may be reflected 
in the director-specific component.  Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013), for example, find 
that a larger pool of local director talent has a significant effect on firm governance.  To examine 
whether firm location subsumes the director-specific component in CEO pay, we estimate a 
model that accounts for Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) fixed effects, where CBSAs are 
defined by the Office of Management and Budget and are retrieved from the ZIP code of the 
firm’s headquarters as reported in Compustat.  In our data there are 188 distinct CBSA codes and 
we find that there is a significant variation in CEO pay that is explained by the different CBSA 
codes (the F-stat of the area code fixed effect is significant at the 0.01 level). 
As discussed earlier, in our base model we find that the scaled coefficient on the residual 
component of director-linked CEO pay is equal to 0.046.  Controlling for CBSA code fixed 
25 Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012), for example, present evidence of a significant firm-fixed effect in CEO pay. 
26 
                                                          
 effects, we find that the coefficient declines to 0.040 and remains highly statistically significant 
(at the 0.01 level). 
The last model takes a most conservative approach and uses firm fixed effects to account 
for unobserved firm characteristics that may affect CEO pay.  Accounting for firm fixed effects, 
however, may also subsume relevant information such as a director-specific component in CEO 
pay, and hence may bias our tests against finding significance. 
Even after accounting for firm fixed effects, however, we find a significant (at the 0.01 
level) and positive relation between CEO pay and the residual portion of director-linked CEO 
pay.  The scaled coefficient is equal to 0.024 which means that a one standard deviation increase 
in the residual component of director-linked CEO pay is associated with a 2.4% increase in total 
CEO pay.  While the economic significance of the director-specific component in CEO pay is 
lower if we control for firm fixed effects than if we do not, the economic significance with firm 
fixed effects is similar in magnitude to the significance we report in our tests based on changes in 
CEO pay, where the scaled coefficient is equal to 0.027.  The similarity of the two estimates and 
their significance supports the conclusion that unobserved firm effects are unlikely to drive our 
main findings. 
Similar to our findings based on the changes in CEO pay, in the firm fixed effects model, 
the predicted portion of director-linked CEO pay is not significantly related to CEO pay.  
Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that a positive relation between the pay of 
director-linked CEOs is due to a director-specific component in CEO pay. 
5. Test for a wider network effect 
The findings presented in the previous sections provide a strong support for the idea that 
after SOX, directors tend to award similar CEO pay across the different firms they serve.  One 
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 potential source of our findings is that directors serving on the same board share information 
about optimal CEO compensation so that overlapping boards tend to award similar pay.  
Bouwman (2011) provides such evidence albeit in the context of general firm governance 
practices. 
In this section we test whether our findings are specific to each director rather to a wider 
network of connected directors.  To that end, we start with our main sample of firms and the 
sample of director-linked firms.  We then identify all firms that share a director with any 
director-linked firm but do not share a director with the base firm.  In effect, we identify firms 
that are indirectly linked to the base firm within a wider network.  We term the average CEO pay 
of these firms “indirectly-linked CEO pay” and examine how the indirectly-linked CEO pay is 
related to CEO pay.  If our main findings are due to directors sharing information about optimal 
CEO pay among each other within a wider network, we expect to find that indirectly-linked CEO 
pay is also positively related to CEO pay. 
We re-estimate the previous regression models but now we examine how CEO pay is 
related to the measure of indirectly-linked CEO pay.  To be conservative in our conclusions, the 
models do not include the director-linked CEO pay as an explanatory variable.  The results are 
presented in Table 1.4.  In all models, indirectly-linked CEO pay is insignificantly related to 
CEO pay, with p-values of 0.331 and higher.  Furthermore, the residual component of director-
linked pay has p-values of 0.705 and higher.  These findings are consistent with the conclusion 
that the identified director-specific component in CEO pay is not due to a wider network effect. 
6. Board composition 
One of the sources of our findings could be the significant change in board composition 
brought about by SOX.  The enactment of SOX and the accompanying changes in exchange 
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 listing requirements lead to a significant increase in board independence (e.g., Linck, Netter, and 
Yang, 2008).  One possible interpretation of our findings is that, as long as it is the board that 
determines CEO pay, a director-specific component would always be present in CEO pay.  If 
CEOs prior to SOX had more power and had the ability to set their own pay, there would be no 
director-specific component in CEO pay.  But if CEOs lost some of their power after SOX due to 
an increase in director independence, for example, CEO pay would be determined by the board 
of directors and a director-specific component in CEO pay would emerge. 
To examine this possibility, we re-estimate the pre-2002 regression models for sub-
samples based on several board composition variables: board independence, CEO duality, board 
size, and the proportion of directors that are lawyers or current executives at other firms.  The 
results are presented in Table 1.5. 
In Panel A of Table 1.5, we create two sub-samples based on whether or not more than 
50% of the directors are classified as independent.  If the change in board independence is 
behind our findings then we expect the director-specific component in CEO pay to be present, 
even prior to SOX, for firms with relatively high board independence.  However, our evidence is 
not consistent with this argument.  Prior to 2002, we find that the residual portion of director-
linked CEO pay is insignificantly related to CEO pay for both more independent and less 
independent boards and that the estimates between the two sub-samples are insignificantly 
different from each other. 
In Panel B of Table 1.5, we use a different approach to classify boards into more and less 
independent.  Because after SOX boards are required to have 100% independent audit, 
nomination, and compensation committees, we estimate our model before SOX separately for 
firm-years that satisfy the post-Sox requirements and firm-years that do not satisfy these 
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 requirements.  We again find no evidence of a significant director-specific component in CEO 
pay in either sub-sample prior to 2002. 
Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) find that after SOX board composition has changed in 
several other dimensions.  They find that CEO duality has declined, board size has increased, and 
the proportion of current executives in the board has declined while the proportion of lawyers 
has increased.  To examine whether these additional changes may be at the roots of our findings, 
we split our sample based on whether or not (i) the firm has a dual CEO (Panel C), (ii) board size 
is above expected (Panel D), (iii) the proportion of current executives in the board is below the 
median of 52.63% (Panel E), and (iv) there are lawyers in the board (Panel F).  Prior to SOX, we 
do not find significant evidence of a director-specific component in CEO pay in any of these sub-
samples. 
Overall, the findings in this section show that there is no director-specific component in 
CEO prior to SOX even for boards that have a composition that is similar to post-SOX boards.  
We conclude that the documented director-specific component in CEO pay is likely not due to 
changes in board composition.  
7. Director risks and incentives 
It is possible that after the adoption of SOX corporate directors have changed their 
behavior when awarding CEO pay.  For example, an increase in board scrutiny and an increase 
in liability risk to individual directors may provide directors with incentives to award CEO pay 
that can be easily justified through direct experiences.  To examine whether director risks play a 
role in our findings, in this section we examine whether and how the director-specific component 
in CEO pay is related to the risk-taking incentives of directors.  Existing literature provides 
significant evidence that option-based pay and the resulting sensitivity to risk affects the 
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 corporate decisions of CEOs, such as investment policy and debt policy (see Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen, 2006 and the references therein).  Motivated by these findings, we use director option-
based pay as a proportion of total director pay to measure director risk-taking incentives.  Data 
on director pay are available starting with 2006 and so the subsequent analysis is based on the 
period of 2006 to 2011 and covers a total of 4,715 firm-years. 
Director option-based pay is not awarded randomly, but instead is awarded conditional 
on the characteristics of the firm, the CEO, and the board.  We, however, are interested in 
director risk-taking incentives that are go beyond firm, CEO, and board characteristics.  To 
adjust for the effects that firm, CEO, and board characteristics have on director option-based pay, 
we first estimate a model where the dependent variable is the proportion of director option-based 
pay and as explanatory variables we use year-industry effects and all additional firm, CEO, and 
board characteristics.  We then use the residuals from these regression models to measure excess 
director option-based pay.  In effect, the residuals measures director option-based pay that is in 
not predicted by firm, CEO, and board characteristics. 
We then bifurcate the sample conditional on excess director option-based pay.  Firm-
years with a positive residual are classified as having a relatively high director option-based pay 
while firm-years with a negative residual are classified as having a relatively low director option-
based pay.  Firm-years with a residual of zero are excluded from the tests. 
The findings in Panel A of Table 1.6 show that, during the period of 2006 to 2011, the 
residual portion of director-linked CEO pay is significantly related to CEO pay only for firm-
years with a relatively low director option-based pay.  Furthermore, the relation is significantly 
different (at the 0.05 level) between the two sub-samples.  In other words, the director-specific 
component in CEO pay is only evident when director risk-taking incentives are relatively low. 
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 In the previous sections of the paper we found that residual director-linked CEO pay is 
not significantly related to CEO pay in 2007.  In light of the findings in this section, we examine 
2007 separately.  For the sub-sample of firms with relatively low excess director option-based 
pay, we find that the estimated coefficient on residual director-linked CEO pay is equal to 0.022, 
which is indistinguishable in magnitude to the overall estimate of 0.024, from the last model of 
Table 1.3.  For the sub-sample of firms with relatively high director option-based pay, the 
coefficient is negative and equal to -0.037.  The lack of an overall director-specific component in 
CEO pay in 2007, therefore, appears to be driven by the sub-sample of firms with directors with 
relatively high risk-taking incentives; directors with relatively low risk-taking incentives still 
exhibit a tendency to award similar CEO pay across the different boards. 
In Panels B and C of Table 1.6 we also examine the director-specific component in CEO 
pay for sub-samples based on expected director turnover (a median of 7.5%) and director 
busyness in the board of directors market (a median of 1.5 boards).  We measure expected 
director turnover using the historic director turnover of each firm.  When firms have relatively 
high director turnover, directors have a higher risk of leaving the firm and thus lower incentives 
to take additional risks.  In these cases, we expect the director-specific component in CEO pay to 
be relatively more pronounced.  Additionally, if directors serve on more boards they may have 
higher reputation and employment concerns if their reputation is negatively affected in one firm 
as a consequence of SOX. 
When we examine the different sub-samples, we find that the director-specific 
component in CEO pay is mostly evident for firm-years with relatively high expected director 
turnover and relatively high director busyness.  Both of these findings are consistent with the 
conclusion that directors with relatively lower risk-taking incentives and directors with relatively 
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 higher sensitivity to risk tend to award CEO pay that is similar across the different boards they 
serve. 
Overall, we find evidence consistent with the idea that, after the enactment of SOX, risk-
averse directors became less willing to take risks when awarding CEO pay, leading to a director-
specific component in CEO pay, so that directors tend to award similar CEO pay across the 
different boards they serve.  Relatively higher option-based pay, lower risk of leaving the firm’s 
board, and lower reputation concerns in the market for directors appear to counterbalance this 
effect. 
8. Conclusions 
Corporate board and governance failures at the turn of the century cast doubt on the 
ability of corporate boards to effectively monitor and compensate CEOs.  With the goal of 
improving the internal governance of U.S. firms, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 
2002 and NYSE and Nasdaq implemented new governance-related listing standards.  While the 
new rules increased the costs and risks to directors and the scrutiny on director decisions, it is 
unclear whether the new rules made it easier to answer one of the oldest questions in corporate 
finance: What constitutes optimal CEO pay? 
How would directors of the board behave in this environment, where optimal CEO pay is 
still elusive yet they may have to justify awarded CEO pay to outside stakeholders and 
regulators?  In this paper we present significant evidence that, following the enactment of SOX, 
directors tend to award similar CEO pay across the different boards they serve—a finding we 
term “a director-specific component in CEO pay”.  We find that the director-specific component 
in CEO pay affects the level and the year-over-year changes in CEO pay and the proportion of 
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 equity-based CEO pay.  These findings indicate that CEO incentives are significantly affected by 
the director-specific component present in CEO pay after SOX. 
We do not find evidence that our results are a manifestation of a wider network effect or 
a consequence of changing board composition after SOX.  Instead, we find some evidence that 
the director-specific component in CEO pay is related to director costs and risks after SOX.  In 
particular, we find that the director-specific component in CEO pay is most pronounced when 
director option-based pay is relatively low, expected turnover is relatively high, and when 
directors serve on relatively more boards, i.e., when have low incentives to take on additional 
risks. 
According to our estimates, after 2002 around ±3.5% of total CEO pay, or around 
±$230,000 per CEO-year on average is awarded as a consequence of this director-specific 
component.  For our post-SOX sample of 7,278 firm-years (i.e., firm-years between 2003 and 
2011), approximately ±$1.7 billion in aggregate CEO pay has been affected as a consequence of 
the tendency of directors to award similar CEO pay across the different boards they serve.  The 
resulting inefficiencies in the allocation of capital are most likely an unintended consequence of 
SOX. 
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 Appendix: Variable definitions 
 
Variable Description 
CEO compensation variable, measured as of fiscal year t 
Total CEO compensation 
The sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock, options, and other compensation 
from Execucomp; (SALARY) + (BONUS prior to December 2006 and 
BONUS plus NONEQ_INCENT thereafter) + (RSTKGRNT prior to 
December 2006 and STOCK_AWARDS_FV thereafter) + 
(OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE prior to December 2006 and 
OPTION_AWARDS_FV thereafter) + (OTHANN + ALLOTHTOT + LTIP 
prior to December 2006 and OTHCOMP thereafter) 
Firm characteristics, measured at end of fiscal year t-1 
Market value of the firm Market value of common stock (Compustat items PRCC_F times CSHO) plus total assets (AT) minus book value of equity (CEQ+TXDB) 
12 month return Return for the fiscal year using CRSP monthly returns and firm-years with 9 or more monthly returns during the year 
Return on assets Net income divided by total assets (Compustat items NI divided by AT) 
Book-to-market Total assets (Compustat item AT) divided by the market value of the firm 
Std. dev. of returns Standard deviation of monthly returns during the 60-month window (with at least 48 observations) preceding the fiscal year 
Leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets (Compustat items LT divided by AT) 
Firm age Years since the firm has data in the CRSP files (year t minus the year of BEGDAT) 
E-index 
Sum of Riskmetrics items CBOARD, LABYLW, LACHTR, PPILL, 
GPARACHUTE, and SUPERMAJOR (set to 1 if more than 50% of votes 
required by board and 0 otherwise); items are set to 0 when missing 
Institutional ownership 
The sum of all shares reported by institutions in CDA/Spectrum (for last 
quarter of year t-1) divided by the total shares outstanding (Compustat item 
CSHO) 
CEO characteristics, measured as of fiscal year t 
CEO age Age of CEO in years, Execucomp item AGE 
CEO tenure Years since the executive became a CEO (Execucomp item  BECAMECEO) 
CEO record 
The number of years prior to year t, for which the CEO has total 
compensation reported on Execucomp, regardless of position and company 
of employement 
CEO ownership Shares owned by CEO (Execucomp item SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS) divided by total shares outstanding (Compustat item CSHO) 
CEO duality dummy Equal to 1 if the CEO serves as the chairman of the board for the given year 
Board characteristics, measured as of fiscal year t 
Board ownership Total shares owned by board members (Riskmetrics NUM_OF_SHARES) divided by total shares outstanding (Compustat CSHO) 
Board size The number of directors for each firm, using data from Riskmetrics 
Board busyness Average number of directorships held by a firm’s board, not including base firm, using the sample in Riskmetrics 
Board industry focus 
The number of board memberships in the industry of firm i divided by the 
total number of board memberships, excluding firm i, using data from 
Riskmetrics 
Board independence The percent of directors classified as “I” (independent) in Riskmetrics 
Director age Age of directors in the board, using data from Riskmetrics 
Director options pay The proportion of director option-based pay relative to total pay from Execucomp 
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 Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1.1 - An example of director-linked firms 
The figure shows a simple example of director-linked firms.  The Base Firm A has three 
directors—1, 2, and 3.  Director 1 further serves on the board of Firm B while Director 2 serves 
on the boards of Firm B and Firm C.  The director-linked CEO pay for the Base Firm A is the 
average CEO pay across all director-linked firms.  In this example the CEO pay of Firm B enters 
twice in the average calculation. 
Director-Linked Firms Base Firm A 
CEO 
Director 1 Firm B 
Director 2 Firm B 
Firm C Director 3 
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 Panel A:  Coefficient on director-linked CEO pay 
 
 
Panel B: Coefficient on residual director-linked CEO pay 
 
Figure 1.2 - The director-specific component in CEO pay 
The figure plots the coefficient estimates on director-linked CEO pay (Panel A) and residual 
director-linked CEO pay (Panel B) from annual regressions where the dependent variable is total 
CEO pay.  As additional explanatory variables the regression models include firm, CEO, and 
board characteristics.  To calculate residual director-linked CEO pay, we first estimate annual 
regression models to explain total CEO pay as a function of all firm, CEO, and board 
characteristics, including year-industry effects.  We then use the residuals from this model to 
construct a measure of residual director-linked CEO pay.  The circles mark the estimated 
coefficients, while the bars and the whiskers define the 90 percent and the 95 percent confidence 
intervals. 
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 Table 1.1 - Summary of variables  
The main sample consists of the intersection of Riksmetrics and Execucomp.  We require 
additional data from the CRSP monthly files, the Compustat annual files, and CDA/Spectrum.  
The base sample consists of 17,395 firm-years with data on Riskmetrics and Execucomp.  
Requiring additional CRSP and Compustat data reduces the sample to 14,987 firm-years.  For 
2,799 of the firm-years, no director holds a seat on other boards and so requiring that at least one 
director participates on at least one other board during the year further reduces our sample to 
12,188 firm-years.  Panel A reports the mean, median, standard deviation, and the 5th and 95th 
percentiles of variables measuring firm, CEO, and board characteristics.  Panel B reports the 
number of firm-years and the mean, median, and standard deviation of director-linked CEO pay, 
conditional on the number of linked firm observations used to calculate director-linked CEO pay.  
All dollar amounts are in millions of 2012 U.S. dollars.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of variables 
Variable Mean 5th pctl Median 95th pctl Std. dev. 
Compensation variables           
Total CEO pay (mill.) 6.581 0.875 4.086 21.023 7.626 
Total CEO pay (mill., log) 1.419 – 0.133 1.408 3.046 0.962 
Director-linked CEO pay (mill.) 6.135 1.446 5.064 14.085 4.709 
Director-linked CEO pay (mill., log) 1.583 0.369 1.622 2.645 0.695 
Firm characteristics 
     
Market value (bill.) 23.025 0.535 4.771 105.345 59.125 
Market value (mill., log) 8.629 6.283 8.470 11.565 1.598 
12-month return (%) 16.110 – 46.990 11.968 93.586 46.993 
Return on assets (%) 4.483 – 7.021 4.633 15.560 8.056 
Book-to-market (log) – 0.485 – 1.441 – 0.375 0.080 0.479 
Standard deviation of returns (%) 11.074 5.183 9.975 21.106 4.974 
Leverage (log) – 0.662 – 1.645 – 0.563 – 0.084 0.467 
Firm age (log) 3.092 1.792 3.178 4.290 0.721 
E-index 2.010 0.000 2.000 5.000 1.373 
Institutional ownership (%) 69.690 35.427 71.458 99.547 18.882 
CEO characteristics 
     
CEO age (log) 4.019 3.807 4.025 4.205 0.118 
CEO tenure (log) 1.770 0.406 1.791 3.091 0.803 
CEO record (log) 1.542 0.693 1.609 2.485 0.637 
CEO duality dummy 0.633     
CEO ownership (%) 1.546 0.007 0.281 9.024 3.853 
Board characteristics 
     
Board ownership (%) 5.751 0.000 1.849 26.844 10.383 
Board size (log) 2.254 1.792 2.303 2.708 0.259 
Board busyness (log) 0.375 0.105 0.336 0.799 0.219 
Board industry focus (%) 5.191 0.000 0.000 50.000 17.803 
Board independence (%) 71.944 42.857 75.000 90.910 15.521 
Director age (log) 4.100 3.991 4.104 4.193 0.061 
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 Panel B: Summary statistics of director-linked CEO pay by number of linked firms 
  Actual Predicted Residual 
Number of 
linked firms 
Firm-years Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
        
1 2,610 1.346 0.940 1.363 0.764 – 0.016 0.548 
2 2,098 1.458 0.710 1.466 0.578 – 0.008 0.405 
3 1,663 1.529 0.612 1.525 0.523 0.004 0.321 
4 1,324 1.607 0.553 1.604 0.477 0.003 0.274 
5 999 1.653 0.545 1.661 0.466 – 0.008 0.269 
6 780 1.729 0.525 1.714 0.466 0.015 0.228 
7 570 1.778 0.490 1.762 0.438 0.016 0.224 
8 440 1.830 0.444 1.826 0.413 0.005 0.202 
9 359 1.841 0.447 1.839 0.422 0.002 0.196 
10 306 1.907 0.491 1.898 0.452 0.009 0.176 
11 235 1.845 0.451 1.851 0.431 – 0.006 0.166 
12 160 1.896 0.448 1.892 0.414 0.003 0.181 
13 151 1.952 0.417 1.935 0.404 0.017 0.142 
14 115 1.880 0.440 1.887 0.407 – 0.007 0.168 
15 106 1.983 0.455 1.982 0.393 0.002 0.145 
16 71 1.992 0.426 1.986 0.382 0.006 0.145 
17 50 1.845 0.432 1.883 0.425 – 0.038 0.122 
18 31 2.053 0.392 2.078 0.383 – 0.025 0.150 
19 31 1.968 0.357 1.959 0.346 0.009 0.144 
≥ 20 89 1.911 0.361 1.923 0.368 – 0.012 0.115 
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 Table 1.2 - The director-specific component in CEO pay 
The main sample consists of firm-years with available data on Riksmetrics, Execucomp, the 
CRSP monthly files, and the Compustat annual files where there is no change in the CEO.  Panel 
A reports estimates from regression models explaining total CEO pay while Panel B reports 
estimates from regression models explaining the year-over-year change in total CEO pay.  As 
explanatory variables in Panel A we use the predicted and residual director-linked CEO pay as 
well as additional firm, CEO, and board characteristics.  As explanatory variables in Panel B we 
use the change and lagged level of director-linked CEO pay as well as changes and lagged levels 
of additional firm, CEO, and board characteristics.  In Panel B we omit changes in variables that 
measure firm age and CEO age, tenure, and record because the year-over-year increments of 
these variables are fixed at one.  The construction of each variable is described in the Appendix.  
To measure the economic effect that each variable has on CEO pay, the last column of the table 
reports the coefficient estimate times the standard deviation of each variable.  All models adjust 
for year-industry effects.  Industries are defined based on three-digit SIC codes.  The reported p-
values (in parenthesis) are based on standard errors that adjust for firm-level and year-level 
clustering (Petersen, 2009).  The last row reports the adjusted R-squared of each model. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is total CEO pay (millions of 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 1996-2001  2003-2011 
 
Coeff. p-value Scaled 
coeff. 
 Coeff. p-value Scaled 
coeff. 
        
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted 0.020 (0.046) 0.022  0.028 (0.008) 0.026 
Director-linked CEO pay, residual 0.002 (0.927) 0.002  0.049 (0.001) 0.046 
Market value (mill., log) 0.429 (0.001) 0.701  0.383 (0.001) 0.601 
12-month return (%) 0.001 (0.094) 0.018  0.002 (0.001) 0.078 
Return on assets (%) 0.001 (0.997) 0.001  – 0.001 (0.731) – 0.005 
Book-to-market (log) 0.025 (0.652) 0.013  0.073 (0.051) 0.032 
Standard deviation of returns (%) 0.026 (0.001) 0.131  – 0.001 (0.874) – 0.006 
Leverage (log) – 0.016 (0.831) – 0.007  0.065 (0.017) 0.031 
Firm age (log) – 0.030 (0.339) – 0.022  – 0.028 (0.130) – 0.020 
E-index – 0.002 (0.863) – 0.002  0.037 (0.001) 0.053 
Institutional ownership (%) 0.005 (0.001) 0.088  0.006 (0.001) 0.102 
CEO age (log) 0.132 (0.502) 0.016  0.146 (0.270) 0.017 
CEO tenure (log) – 0.001 (0.984) 0.001  0.052 (0.078) 0.041 
CEO record (log) 0.119 (0.005) 0.067  0.005 (0.892) 0.003 
CEO ownership (%) – 0.035 (0.001) – 0.153  – 0.028 (0.001) – 0.095 
CEO duality dummy 0.138 (0.001) 0.062  0.085 (0.002) 0.042 
Board ownership (%) – 0.003 (0.157) – 0.037  0.001 (0.518) 0.013 
Board size (log) 0.761 (0.095) 0.221  0.402 (0.573) 0.094 
Board busyness (log) 0.093 (0.221) 0.023  0.325 (0.001) 0.063 
Board industry focus (%) 0.002 (0.123) 0.032  0.002 (0.001) 0.041 
Board independence (%) 0.001 (0.691) 0.008  0.004 (0.001) 0.057 
        
    
Number of observations 4,133  7,278 
Adjusted R-squared 55.69%  55.87% 
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 Panel B: Dependent variable is the change in total CEO pay (mill 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 1996-2001  2003-2011 
 
Coeff. p-value Scaled 
coeff. 
 Coeff. p-value Scaled 
coeff. 
Changes in variables        
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted 0.002 (0.920) 0.001  – 0.002 (0.869) – 0.002 
Director-linked CEO pay, residual – 0.001 (0.928) – 0.001  0.025 (0.043) 0.027 
Market value (mill., log) 0.327 (0.051) 0.101  0.173 (0.061) 0.048 
12-month return (%) – 0.001 (0.297) – 0.106  0.002 (0.028) 0.104 
Return on assets (%) – 0.002 (0.624) – 0.012  – 0.002 (0.371) – 0.014 
Book-to-market (log) – 0.108 (0.624) – 0.029  0.045 (0.684) 0.010 
Standard deviation of returns (%) 0.026 (0.112) 0.033  – 0.015 (0.197) – 0.026 
Leverage (log) – 0.223 (0.013) – 0.036  0.035 (0.613) 0.006 
E-index 0.075 (0.297) 0.030  0.025 (0.195) 0.028 
Institutional ownership (%) 0.006 (0.079) 0.047  0.003 (0.002) 0.023 
CEO ownership (%) – 0.005 (0.825) – 0.006  0.010 (0.421) 0.013 
CEO duality dummy 0.104 (0.001) 0.028  – 0.011 (0.775) – 0.003 
Board ownership (%) – 0.006 (0.024) – 0.044  – 0.002 (0.475) – 0.009 
Board size (log) 0.156 (0.886) 0.017  – 0.547 (0.353) – 0.058 
Board busyness (log) 0.050 (0.574) 0.006  0.057 (0.210) 0.007 
Board industry focus (%) 0.001 (0.892) 0.001  0.001 (0.193) 0.010 
Board independence (%) 0.001 (0.879) – 0.004  0.001 (0.101) 0.010 
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 Panel B (continued): Dependent variable is the change in total CEO pay (mill 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 1996-2001  2003-2011 
 
Coeff. p-value Scaled 
coeff. 
 Coeff. p-value Scaled 
coeff. 
Lagged variables        
Total CEO pay (mill., log) – 0.571 (0.001) – 0.562  – 0.479 (0.001) – 0.434 
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted 0.024 (0.037) 0.026  0.014 (0.219) 0.013 
Director-linked CEO pay, residual 0.011 (0.564) 0.011  0.036 (0.001) 0.036 
Market value (mill., log) 0.235 (0.001) 0.376  0.172 (0.001) 0.270 
12-month return (%) – 0.001 (0.255) – 0.069  0.002 (0.081) 0.067 
Return on assets (%) 0.003 (0.157) 0.018  0.001 (0.715) 0.007 
Book-to-market (log) 0.031 (0.501) 0.016  0.054 (0.037) 0.024 
Standard deviation of returns (%) 0.016 (0.032) 0.066  – 0.004 (0.279) – 0.017 
Leverage (log) – 0.039 (0.267) – 0.016  0.068 (0.001) 0.033 
Firm age (log) 0.004 (0.809) 0.003  – 0.026 (0.129) – 0.018 
E-index – 0.001 (0.943) – 0.001  0.008 (0.456) 0.012 
Institutional ownership (%) 0.002 (0.022) 0.035  0.004 (0.001) 0.064 
CEO age (log) – 0.045 (0.698) – 0.005  0.181 (0.033) 0.021 
CEO tenure (log) – 0.020 (0.565) – 0.016  0.001 (0.986) 0.001 
CEO record (log) 0.087 (0.042) 0.047  – 0.005 (0.830) – 0.003 
CEO ownership (%) – 0.021 (0.017) – 0.091  – 0.011 (0.015) – 0.039 
CEO duality dummy 0.068 (0.001) 0.030  0.040 (0.049) 0.019 
Board ownership (%) – 0.002 (0.511) – 0.019  0.001 (0.549) 0.009 
Board size (log) 0.380 (0.066) 0.110  – 0.039 (0.934) – 0.009 
Board busyness (log) 0.181 (0.218) 0.044  0.190 (0.007) 0.039 
Board industry focus (%) 0.001 (0.526) 0.013  0.002 (0.014) 0.027 
Board independence (%) 0.001 (0.684) 0.007  0.002 (0.001) 0.032 
        
    
Number of observations 2,530  5,329 
Adjusted R-squared 27.75%  28.40% 
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 Table 1.3 - The director-specific component for different specifications 
The main sample consists of 7,278 firm-years between 2003 and 2011 with available data on 
Riksmetrics, Execucomp, the CRSP monthly files, and the Compustat annual files.  The table 
reports scaled coefficient estimates (coefficient estimates times the standard deviation of each 
variable) for models examining the relation between CEO pay and director-linked CEO pay.  All 
models adjust for year-industry effects, where industries are defined based on three-digit SIC 
codes.  Furthermore, all models control for additional firm, CEO, and board characteristics as in 
Table 1.2, Panel A.  The construction of each variable is described in the Appendix.  Apart from 
reporting the estimates from the base model, we also estimate models that control for area code 
fixed effects and models that control for firm fixed effects.  The p-values (in parenthesis) are 
based on standard errors that adjust for firm-level and year-level clustering. 
 
 
Base model With CBSA code 
fixed effects 
With firm fixed 
effects 
       Director-linked CEO pay 0.049  0.041  0.027  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)         Director-linked CEO pay, predicted  0.026  0.023  0.012 
  (0.008)  (0.061)  (0.324)        Director-linked CEO pay, residual  0.046  0.036  0.024 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.010) 
       
       All other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 7,278 7,278 7,278 7,278 7,278 7,278 
p-value of CBSA code fixed effects   0.001 0.001   
p-value of firm fixed effects     0.001 0.001 
Adjusted R-squared 55.81% 55.87% 57.79% 57.81% 75.39% 75.40% 
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 Table 1.4 - Tests for a wider network effect 
The starting sample consists of 7,278 firm-years between 2003 and 2011 with available data on 
Riksmetrics, Execucomp, the CRSP monthly files, and the Compustat annual files.  The table 
reports scaled coefficient estimates (coefficient estimates times the standard deviation of each 
variable) for models examining the relation between CEO pay of firm i  and the pay of CEOs 
that do not share directors with firm i  but share directors with firm i ’s director-linked firms.  
We term this variable non-linked CEO pay, and we are able to calculate it for 6,909 firm-years.  
All models adjust for year-industry effects, where industries are defined based on three-digit SIC 
codes.  Furthermore, all models control for additional firm, CEO, and board characteristics as in 
Table 1.2, Panel A.  The construction of each variable is described in the Appendix.  Apart from 
reporting the estimates from the base model, we also estimate models that control for CBSA 
code fixed effects and models that control for firm fixed effects.  The p-values (in parenthesis) 
are based on standard errors that adjust for firm-level and year-level clustering. 
 
 
Base model With CBSA code 
fixed effects 
With firm fixed 
effects 
       Non-linked CEO pay 0.010  0.008  0.004  
 (0.331)  (0.433)  (0.663)         Non-linked CEO pay, predicted  0.010  0.009  0.006 
  (0.345)  (0.384)  (0.568)        Non-linked CEO pay, residual  0.003  0.001  – 0.003 
  (0.828)  (0.975)  (0.705) 
       
       All other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 6,909 6,909 6,909 6,909 6,909 6,909 
p-value of CBSA code fixed effects   0.001 0.001   
p-value of firm fixed effects     0.001 0.001 
Adjusted R-squared 55.27% 55.25% 57.32% 57.32% 75.70% 75.70% 
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 Table 1.5 - Pre-SOX tests conditional on board composition 
The main sample consists of 4,133 firm-years between 1996 and 2001 with available data on 
Riksmetrics, Execucomp, the CRSP monthly files, and the Compustat annual files.  The table 
reports scaled coefficient estimates (coefficient estimates times the standard deviation of each 
variable) for models examining the relation between CEO pay and director-linked CEO pay for 
two sub-samples based on board independence and CEO duality.  All models adjust for year-
industry effects, where industries are defined based on three-digit SIC codes, and firm fixed 
effects.  Furthermore, all models control for additional firm, CEO, and board characteristics as in 
Table 1.2, Panel A.  The construction of each variable is described in the Appendix.  In Panel A, 
the sub-samples of low and high board independence are formed based on whether or not the 
proportion of independent directors is less than 1/2.  In Panel B, boards with high independence 
are those with a majority of independent directors and 100% independent audit, compensation, 
and nomination/governance committees.  The remaining boards are classified as having low 
board independence.  Since data on board independence by committee is not available for the full 
sample, in Panel B there are fewer observations than in Panel A.  In Panel C we split the sample 
based on whether or not the CEO is also the chairman of the board (COB).  In Panel D we split 
the sample based on board size, where we first estimate a regression model with board size as the 
dependent variable and firm and CEO characteristics as the independent variables.  If the 
residual of this regression is negative we classify firms as having relatively low board size, and if 
the residual is positive we classify the firm as having relatively high board size.  In Panel E we 
split the sample based on whether the proportion of current executives in the board is less than 
the median of 52.63%, and in Panel F we split the sample based on whether the proportion of 
lawyers in the board is 0% (the median) or above 0%.  The p-values (in parenthesis) are based on 
standard errors that adjust for firm-level and year-level clustering.  The last column reports the 
difference (p-values in parenthesis) between the estimates for the two sub-samples. 
 
Panel A: Board independence based on whether or not 50% of all directors are independent 
Dependent variable is total CEO pay (millions of 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 
Low board 
independence 
High board 
independence 
Diff. in scaled 
coefficients 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted – 0.012 0.005 0.017 
 
(0.529) (0.623) (0.457) 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, residual – 0.021 – 0.007 0.014 
 
(0.452) (0.605) (0.677) 
    
    
Number of observations 678 3,455 
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 Panel B: Board independence based on whether or not 50% of all directors and 100% of the audit, compensation, 
and nomination committees are independent 
Dependent variable is total CEO pay (millions of 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 
Low board 
independence 
High board 
independence 
Diff. in scaled 
coefficients 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted 0.013 – 0.002 – 0.015 
 
(0.100) (0.709) (0.008) 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, residual – 0.012 0.009 0.021 
 
(0.233) (0.590) (0.059) 
    
    
Number of observations 2,076 644 
 
     
Panel C: CEO duality 
Dependent variable is total CEO pay (millions of 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 
CEO is chairman of 
the board 
CEO is not chairman 
of the board 
Diff. in scaled 
coefficients 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted 0.001 0.009 0.008 
 
(0.958) (0.566) (0.658) 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, residual – 0.002 – 0.022 – 0.020 
 
(0.905) (0.237) (0.411) 
    
    
Number of observations 2,757 1,376 
 
     
Panel D: Board size 
Dependent variable is total CEO pay (millions of 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 
Lower than expected 
board size 
Higher than expected 
board size 
Diff. in scaled 
coefficients 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted – 0.005 0.007 0.012 
 
(0.677) (0.587) (0.532) 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, residual – 0.025 0.005 0.030 
 
(0.244) (0.664) (0.261) 
    
    
Number of observations 1,967 1,689 
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 Panel E: Percent directors that are current executives (median is 52.63%) 
Dependent variable is total CEO pay (millions of 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 
Lower than median 
current executives 
Higher than median 
current executives 
Diff. in scaled 
coefficients 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted 0.011 0.002 – 0.009 
 
(0.325) (0.810) (0.205) 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, residual 0.006 – 0.038 – 0.044 
 
(0.790) (0.003) (0.060) 
    
    
Number of observations 1,426 1,428 
 
     
Panel F: Percent directors that are lawyers (median is 0%) 
Dependent variable is total CEO pay (millions of 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 
0% lawyers Higher than 0% 
lawyers 
Diff. in scaled 
coefficients 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted 0.004 0.012 0.009 
 
(0.818) (0.346) (0.697) 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, residual – 0.032 0.009 0.041 
 
(0.109) (0.499) (0.116) 
    
    
Number of observations 1,832 1,022 
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 Table 1.6 - Post-SOX tests conditional on director incentives 
The main sample consists of 7,278 firm-years between 2003 and 2011 with available data on 
Riksmetrics, Execucomp, the CRSP monthly files, and the Compustat annual files.  The table 
reports scaled coefficient estimates (coefficient estimates times the standard deviation of each 
variable) for models examining the relation between CEO pay and director-linked CEO pay for 
two sub-samples based on excess director option-based compensation (Panel A), year t-1 to year 
t director turnover (Panel B), and director busyness (Panel C).  We have director compensation 
data starting with 2006 and thus Panel A uses 4,715 firm-years between 2006 and 2011. 
Availability of the sorting variables dictates the sample size for the other panels.  We adjust for 
year-industry effects, where industries are defined based on three-digit SIC codes, and for firm 
fixed effects.  Furthermore, all models control for additional firm, CEO, and board 
characteristics as in Table 1.2, Panel A.  The construction of each variable is described in the 
Appendix.  In Panel A, to construct the two sub-samples, we first estimate a regression model 
where the dependent variable is the option-based compensation of all directors relative to their 
total compensation.  As explanatory variables we use year-industry effects as well as all other 
firm, CEO, and director characteristics.  Firm-years with a negative residual are classified as 
having low excess director option-based compensation while firm-years with a positive residual 
are classified as having high excess director option-based compensation.  We exclude 934 firm-
years with a residual equal to 0.  In Panel B, firms with year t-1 to year t director turnover less 
than or equal to (greater than) 7.5% are classified as low (high) director turnover firm-years.  In 
Panel C, boards with directors that on average serve on fewer than 1.5 boards are classified as 
having less busy directors.  The p-values (in parenthesis) are based on standard errors that adjust 
for firm-level and year-level clustering.  The last column reports the difference (p-values in 
parenthesis) between the estimates for the two sub-samples. 
 
Panel A: Director option-based pay 
Dependent variable is total CEO pay (millions of 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 
Lower than expected 
director option-based 
pay 
Higher than expected 
director option-based 
pay 
Diff. in scaled 
coefficients 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted 0.009 0.008 – 0.001 
 
(0.134) (0.493) (0.897) 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, residual 0.021 – 0.008 – 0.029 
 
(0.003) (0.581) (0.025) 
    
    
Number of observations 2,192 1,589 
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Panel B: Director turnover (median is 7.5%) 
Dependent variable is total CEO pay (millions of 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 
Lower than median 
director turnover 
Higher than median 
director turnover 
Diff. in scaled 
coefficients 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted 0.001 0.009 0.008 
 
(0.842) (0.373) (0.424) 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, residual 0.008 0.020 0.012 
 
(0.287) (0.001) (0.040) 
    
    
Number of observations 3,425 3,286 
 
     
Panel C: Director busyness (median 1.5 boards) 
Dependent variable is total CEO pay (millions of 2012 U.S. dollars, log) 
 
Lower than median 
director busyness 
Higher than median 
director busyness 
Diff. in scaled 
coefficients 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, predicted 0.001 0.010 0.009 
 
(0.892) (0.199) (0.513) 
    
Director-linked CEO pay, residual 0.010 0.022 0.012 
 
(0.306) (0.013) (0.325) 
    
    
Number of observations 3,605 3,617 
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 ESSAY TWO: WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN? DIRECTOR PAY AND 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
 
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? – Juvenal, Satire VI. 
1. Introduction 
Directors are appointed to oversee the management of public firms and protect the 
interests of owners who are not able to conduct such oversight themselves. Board members do 
not have direct control of most firm assets nor do they have the direct authority to guide 
operations. Instead, the board controls executive salaries and appointments, and they oversee 
financial reporting and disclosure for the firm in order to ensure that accurate information is 
communicated to firm owners. Directors also function in determining the addition or 
replacement of members of the board itself, as well as the compensation board members 
receive1. This self-determination in pay serves to weaken the alignment between director and 
firm owner objectives. Research on CEO and executive compensation often examines the 
possibility that the board will simply bow to the whims of powerful executives in order to retain 
their directorships and gain financial benefits, with the result that the interests of investors are 
not adequately served (Bebchuck, Fried, and Walker [2002]).  
1 Detailed analysis of board activities and features can be found in Hermalin and Weisbach (2003); Adams, 
Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010); and Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2012). 
53 
 
                                                          
 Retail investors, bearing relatively low levels of financial risk and having little voting 
power in any individual firm due to their small financial scale, may not have the incentive or the 
power to directly monitor or influence the management of a firm. Large institutional investors, 
however, often have large financial stakes in firms, and thus have substantial financial incentive 
and a larger share of voting rights that make more direct oversight of firm activity possible 
(Shleifer and Vishny [1986]; Admati et al. [1994]). Gillan and Starks (2000) find that 
shareholder proposals sponsored by institutions or coordinated groups of investors generally 
receive more votes than proposals sponsored by individual activist investors. Hartzell and Starks 
(2003) find that both the level and concentration of institutional ownership in a firm affects 
executive pay level and pay-performance sensitivity2. Investing firms may, however, choose not 
to influence the governance of firms they invest in directly.  Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) find 
that institutional ownership decreases prior to forced CEO turnover, suggesting that investment 
firms may choose to exit a stock rather than attempt to change firm behavior. 
 The monitoring incentives of institutional investors  likely varies, as supported by the 
work of David, Kochhar, and Levitas (1998) who find the effect of institutional ownership on 
CEO compensation depends on the type of institutions involved.  Chen, Hartford and Li (2007) 
find that institutions with longer investment horizons tend to have a stronger effect on post-
merger performance than the ownership of firms with shorter investment horizons. Almazan, 
Hartzell, and Starks (2005) find that ownership by institutions classified as “potentially active 
investors” appears to have stronger effects on executive pay levels and pay-performance 
sensitivity than ownership by more passive firms. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) find 
that activism by hedge funds is at least partially successful in two-thirds of cases and that 
2 These conclusions have been questioned by Smith and Swan (2013), as the results are not found if one does a 
simple log transform on the firm size variable used in the analysis. 
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 targeted firms increase operating performance and see higher CEO turnover as a result. 
Greenwood and Schor (2009) find that hedge funds are more likely to initiate events associated 
with shareholder activism and that firms targeted by activist investors are more likely to be 
acquired. Ertimur, Feri, and Muslu (2014) examine a sample of shareholder proposals related to 
executive pay and find that union pension funds sponsor most of these activist proposals. 
Further, they find that firms with excess CEO pay appear to be affected by these proposals and 
decrease CEO compensation significantly. 
There is potential for both the board of directors and institutional owners to contribute to 
the governance of the firm. The interaction between these internal and external governance 
mechanisms is not straightforward, as illustrated in the model of Cohn and Rajan (2013) which 
predicts that internal and external governance mechanisms can be either substitutes or 
complements depending on the severity of agency conflicts within the firm. 
The financial literature has largely focused on executive and CEO compensation for 
analyzing the effects of the quality of governance on a firm3. This is not without reason, as the 
CEO generally represents the largest salary expense for the firm, and other non-CEO executives 
also receive high levels of compensation. Executive compensation also receives high levels of 
public scrutiny and is the subject of much governmental regulation. The CEO and other 
executives are also tasked with managing the day to day operations of the firm. Directors are 
compensated at lower levels compared to firm executives and are not directly involved in day to 
day operations, and so it may be thought that their pay is relatively inconsequential. In our 
sample, the average sum of compensation for the entire board is roughly comparable to the 
3 For example, Bebchuck and Weisbach’s 2010 summary of corporate governance literature only discusses the 
compensation of firm executives, and boards are only examined in their composition or discussed as bargaining 
parties in the determination of executive compensation. 
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 compensation for an average non-CEO executive, and the annual compensation for a CEO in our 
sample is around 3.5 times that of the pay for the entire board.  
Even at these lower relative levels, director compensation may yield insights as to the 
governance of the firm as a whole.  As noted in Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010), 
directors serve as advisors for the managers of the firm and are involved in setting overall firm 
strategy. The board also wields the power to dismiss the CEO. Further, the actions of directors 
may be influenced by even small changes in compensation levels. Adams and Ferreira (2008) 
find that director meeting attendance increases with the amount of meeting fees they are paid, 
even though the average meeting fee was only $1,000 in their sample. Abnormally high director 
compensation can also be an indicator of weak governance in a firm. Brick, Palmon, and Wald 
(2006) find evidence that excess director compensation is related to firm underperformance and 
that this excess director compensation may coincide with higher CEO compensation as a result 
of mutually beneficial cronyism. The compensation of directors, despite being lower than 
executive pay, can thus influence the strategic direction and performance of the entire firm. 
Firms frequently use equity based compensation in order to better align director 
incentives with owner interests. Yermack (2004) analyzes the pay-performance relationship for 
directors and finds that a large portion of pay-performance sensitivity comes through the 
increased likelihood of obtaining outside board seats for directors of firms with high stock 
returns. Becher et al. (2005) find a shift toward equity based compensation for directors in the 
U.S. banking industry following deregulation. Farrell, Firesen, and Hersch (2008) find evidence 
that firms use fixed-value equity compensation for directors. Dong (2012) argues that the use of 
equity based compensation for board members is more important when directors are friendly 
with CEOs and less important when there is more competition in the firm’s industry. 
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 The compensation of directors and the level of institutional investment in a firm may be 
linked in several possible ways. High levels of institutional investment would incentivize 
institutions to become more involved in the oversight of a firm. This increased oversight might 
reduce any excess pay directors had been receiving, thus lowering total compensation. This 
would be consistent with a similar effect in CEO compensation, documented in Fahlenbrach 
(2009). On the other hand, governance may be an expensive good worth paying for, and higher 
levels of owner involvement might lead the firm to pay more for better directors. Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2009) find that firms affected by new board requirements in 2001 and 2002 
tended to see reductions in CEO compensation following these changes in board structure. The 
effect was largest when firms had low concentrations of institutional investors, suggesting that 
there is an interaction between inside and outside monitoring in the governance of the firm. 
However, further analysis by Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan (2012) attribute much of the 
decrease in CEO compensation following these board changes to two observations in the sample, 
and they conclude that board independence does not affect CEO compensation. They also find 
that independence requirements for compensation committees actually increase CEO 
compensation. There is no standard prediction for the relationship between institutional 
ownership and director compensation, and we are left to empirical methods to determine the 
functional relationship between these two variables.  
Little research has been done specifically concerning the effect of institutional ownership 
on director pay. Cordeiro, Veliyath, and Eramus (2000) examine a small sample of firms and do 
not find any relationship between institutional ownership and director compensation in their 
multivariate tests. We examine a much larger sample and find that higher levels of institutional 
ownership are correlated with higher levels of director pay. We also find that institutional 
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 ownership levels are positively correlated with the use of equity based compensation for 
directors. Even after accounting for firm size, past performance, firm risk, and several board 
characteristics, both of these results are highly statistically significant. This suggests a strong 
association between the levels of institutional investment and the amount and type of 
compensation that directors receive. Institutional investors appear to be willing to pay higher 
amounts for directors, but also appear to use higher levels of equity based pay to strengthen the 
relationship between firm performance and director wealth. Further, we find that active 
institutional investors appear to have a larger impact than passive institutions on the pay level 
and composition of directors. This suggests that the investment level of active firms is more 
important in setting the compensation of directors; however, post-regression testing reveals that 
we cannot distinguish between the two effects statistically. Thus, we conclude that there is no 
statistical difference in the effects of active and passive institutional investors in our sample. 
2. Data 
Our sample is constructed using Compustat’s Directorcomp file, Thompson Reuters 
Institutional Holdings data, and RiskMetrics Director and Governance data. The Directorcomp 
database begins in 2006, coinciding with an SEC rule change which required firms to disclose 
director pay in a manner similar to prior executive compensation disclosure. Thus, our sample 
spans from 2006 to 2012. Further, we include firm level financial data from Compustat’s annual 
file and stock return data from CRSP. The final testing sample contains 6,286 firm-year 
observations, and we winsorize the sample at the 1st and 99th percentile tails. 
Our main tests are for the relationship between the level of institutional ownership in a 
firm and that firm’s director pay and equity based compensation. Institutional ownership is 
measured as the proportion of a firm’s shares that are held by institutions as reported in 13F 
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 reports. We use the average pay of directors for each firm as the measure of total director 
compensation, and consistent with Becher et al. (2005), we use equity based compensation, the 
value of stock plus option grants divided by total compensation, as a measure of performance 
related compensation for directors in our sample4. 
Research has shown that some institutions may be more active in monitoring firm 
behavior than others. We construct measures of active and passive institutional ownership levels 
by using the type coding found in 13f filings in the Institutional Holdings data. Using updated 
coding data5, we follow the methods of Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) and classify 
investment companies and independent investment advisers as active institutions. Firms that are 
coded as bank trusts, insurance companies, pension funds, endowments, or miscellaneous are 
categorized as passive institutions. The differentiation is driven by an assumption about the 
differences in monitoring costs among the various types of institutions. Banks, insurance firms, 
and pension funds face higher regulatory and legal restrictions on their investments, while 
investment companies and independent investment advisers are not as restricted in their 
investment options. Further, Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) make the claim that 
investment companies and advisory firms likely have more skilled employees and are likely to 
collect more information. 
The average firm in our sample pays its directors $186,438, with 50.6% of this 
compensation coming in the form of stock or option grants. The average total board pay for our 
firms is around $1.7 million. For comparison, the average CEO of firms in our sample receives 
$5.8 million in total compensation, and the average non-CEO executive receives total pay of 
4 Pay-performance sensitivity of total wealth is the standard measure of performance based pay for executives (see 
Yermack [1995], for example). However, Directorcomp and Riskmetrics data is insufficient to calculate firm 
specific wealth for directors, as it lacks the appropriate detail on accumulated options holdings. 
5 Available from Brian Bushee’s website, http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/. 
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 $2.1 million. Institutions own 78.9% of the average firm in our sample, with an active ownership 
level of 56.6% and a passive ownership level of 22.3%.  
We control for several firm and board specific factors. Firm market value is one of the 
largest predictors of compensation for all executives, and we calculate this variable as the sum of 
the value of debt and equity for each firm at the end of the previous fiscal year. Firm value is 
highly skewed; the average firm in our sample has a market value of $18 billion, while the 
median firm has a market value of only $4.5 billion. We use a log transform of this market value 
in our regressions, as this is more consistent with the empirical distribution of firm size and is the 
focus of Smith and Swan’s (2013) critique of Hartzell and Starks (2003). We measure firm 
performance with annual stock returns calculated from the CRSP monthly file, and we also 
include a measure of accounting performance by calculating each firm's return on assets for each 
year. 
Since director compensation often contains equity based components to achieve incentive 
alignment, directors bear some portion of firm risk. We account for this factor by controlling for 
the standard deviation of monthly stock returns during a five-year window ending before the start 
of the fiscal year. Our sample contains only firms that have at least 48 monthly observations 
during this window. Linn and Park (2005) find that director compensation is positively related to 
the investment opportunity set of the firm, and so we also include the book to market value of 
firms’ assets in our tests. 
The characteristics of the board itself may influence compensation. In the model of 
Adams and Ferreira (2007), board independence is positively correlated with shareholder value.  
Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that board size and independence are negatively related to average 
director pay and equity based compensation, and we include both the log number of board 
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 members and the proportion of independent board members in our regressions. We also include a 
measure of board busyness, as it has been examined in the context of governance quality (Core, 
Holthausen, Larcker [1999]; Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard [2003]; Fich and Shivdasani 
[2006]). Further, we control for other director-specific characteristics by including the average 
director stock ownership in the firm, the proportion of female board members, the proportion of 
board members with financial expertise, and the average director age for the board in our 
regressions. 
The average board in our sample contains 9.4 members, 78.7% of whom are independent 
outside directors. 12.2% of board members are female, and 13.2% have financial experience in 
their background.  Directors in our sample hold 0.819 external board seats on average. The 
average director is 62 years old, and owns 0.5% of the firm’s stock. 
In addition, to control for possible indications of CEO entrenchment (signaling lower 
incentives for boards to monitor), we include a variable indicating whether a board is classified 
(staggered elections) or not. While this variable is subsumed by the E-Index of Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell (2008), irregularities in the reporting of governance components  make the E-Index 
unreliable during our years of observation. In unreported tests, we find that the classified board 
indicator is the most significant of the individual E-Index components, and we use it instead of 
the full E-Index. 49.7% of the firms in our sample have a classified board. 
3. Results 
Our primary tests concern the effects of institutional ownership on the level and 
composition of director pay. For our main analysis, we estimate the following two regression 
models: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿.  𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 ∗ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (1) 
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           𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 ∗ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (2) 
We use the log average total director pay as the dependent variable in our first regression 
and the average proportion of equity based compensation (EBC) in our second regression. In 
addition to institutional ownership, our independent variable of interest, we also include in our 
regressions firm and board characteristics as explanatory variables (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) and use fixed year and 
industry (3 digit SIC) effects and clustered standard errors at the firm level. 
Institutional ownership and total director compensation could be related in two ways in 
our regression. A positive sign on the ownership coefficient would reflect that institutional 
investors prefer to pay directors more, with the assumption being that this higher pay would 
result in better governance. A negative coefficient would be consistent with the theory that 
institutional investors serve to reign in directors paying themselves excessive salaries.  
For the second regression, our ex-ante prediction is that institutional investors would 
prefer a stronger pay-performance link for directors, and we expect the coefficient on 
institutional ownership to have a positive influence on equity based compensation proportions. 
This test is analogous to Hartzell and Starks (2003), which finds a positive relation between 
institutional ownership levels and the pay-performance sensitivity of executives.  
    Our results in Table 2.2 show that higher levels of institutional ownership are 
correlated with higher average levels of director pay. At the mean director pay level, a one 
standard deviation increase in lagged institutional ownership would correspond to an increase in 
average director pay of about $13,000 or around a 7.9% increase in compensation, and this 
coefficient is highly statistically significant in our regressions. The only larger economic effect 
we find in our first regression is due to the market value of the firm, with a standard deviation in 
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 log market value corresponding to a 34.73% increase in average director compensation. 
Institutional investors appear to prefer to pay directors higher levels of compensation. 
Our second regression uses the average proportion of director pay that is based on equity 
(stock and options) as the dependent variable. As expected, we find that lagged institutional 
ownership is positively correlated to the proportion of equity based compensation that directors 
receive, as shown in Table 2.3. The proportion of EBC directors receive increases about 3.5% for 
every standard deviation increase in lagged institutional ownership. The only larger economic 
impact we find in our regressions is due to the book to market ratio for the firm. A standard 
deviation increase in log book to market corresponds to a decrease of 5.1% in EBC for directors. 
As with firm executives, institutions appear to prefer stronger links between compensation and 
performance for directors. 
Thus far, our results suggest that there is a statistically strong relationship between the 
level of institutional ownership in a firm and the level and composition of director pay for that 
firm. We also examine the possible differences between the effects of different types of 
institutional ownership. Works by David, Kochhar, and Levitas (1998) and Almazan, Hartzell, 
and Starks (2005) find that the effect of institutional ownership on executive compensation levels 
and structure depends on the type of institutions that have invested in a firm. Based on the 
assumption that active institutions have lower monitoring costs than passive institutions, we 
expect that active ownership would have a stronger effect on director compensation than passive 
ownership.  
Decomposing the institutional ownership variable into active and passive institutions in 
Table 2.4, we find that active ownership has a larger and more statistically significant 
relationship with both the level and composition of director compensation than passive 
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 institutional ownership. For each standard deviation increase in the proportion of active 
ownership, average total director compensation increases by about $12,800, which is about the 
same economic impact as the overall level of institutional ownership. A one standard deviation 
increase in passive ownership would correspond to around a $4,100 increase in total 
compensation. Further, a standard deviation increase in active ownership would predict a 2.6% 
increase in the proportion of EBC directors receive, again similar to the result for overall 
institutional ownership. In contrast, a standard deviation increase in passive ownership would 
only predict an increase in EBC of around 0.6%, and the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. 
These results suggest that active ownership is more highly correlated with director 
compensation than the ownership of potentially passive investors, and indeed, the economic 
interpretations suggest that active ownership changes can account for the entire effect of overall 
institutional ownership. However, tests for equality between the coefficients in both regressions 
of Table 2.4 fail to find a statistically significant difference between the effects of active and 
passive institutional ownership. Further refining the distinction between active and passive 
investment types may yield clearer results, but in our tests, we cannot conclude that there is a 
difference between our classifications. These results are partially consistent with the findings of 
Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) who find qualitatively similar results, but their coefficients 
are statistically separable. 
4. Instrumental Variable Estimation 
The main complication in interpreting our results is the possibility that endogeneity exists 
between director monitoring levels and the choice institutions make when they invest in a firm.  
Thus far, our regression formulations assume that institutional investors affect director pay, but 
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 the reverse could just as easily be true. Institutions may select firms for investment based upon 
certain board or firm characteristics that also lead to higher pay and EBC levels. If higher board 
pay and EBC is thought to be a proxy for better monitoring and governance, then institutions 
would favor investment in firms with those features, ceteris paribus. This is the case in Chung 
and Zhang (2011), who find that the level of institutional investment in a firm tends to increase 
with measures of governance quality derived from the ISS Governance database. 
We estimate an instrumental variable to address this endogeneity concern. In an approach 
similar to that used in Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009), we use the median institutional 
investment of other firms in the same SIC two-digit industry and size quartile as our instrument. 
Institutional investment will vary exogenously between industries due to the presence of sector 
and capitalization based mutual funds, providing a source of variation to firms’ institutional 
ownership levels unrelated to director compensation. 
Table 2.5 contains the results from this regression. The industry median values are 
statistically significant in the first stage regression, supporting its relevance as an instrument for 
institutional ownership. The Anderson-Rubin F-statistic is highly statistically significant, and the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is larger than the 10% critical value suggesting that our 
instrument is not weak. The results of the second stage regression show that institutional 
ownership does have a positive and statistically significant effect on the average level of director 
pay. Our IV coefficients are similar in magnitude to those from an ordinary least squares 
regression, reducing the concern that endogeneity is heavily influencing the results of our 
previous single stage regressions. 
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 5. Conclusion 
Our analysis finds that there is a positive and significant relationship between the level of 
institutional ownership in a firm and the level and composition of director compensation for that 
firm. We find that both active and passive institutional ownership is positively related to director 
total pay and EBC. Economic impacts suggest that active ownership has a much stronger relation 
with both pay level and EBC than passive ownership, however no statistical difference can be 
found between the two in our regressions. These results are further confirmed by IV regressions 
accounting for the endogeneity between institutional investment and director compensation 
levels, and these results are similar in magnitude and significance to single stage regressions. 
One potential interpretation of our results is that institutional investors are willing to pay 
more for good governance. This would further predict that firms with more highly paid board 
members would have better performance than other firms with underpaid directors. Such 
conclusions require further testing of firm performance as it relates to governance and 
institutional investment levels.  
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 Tables 
 
Table 2.1 - Summary of variables 
Our sample consists of data from Directorcomp, Riskmetrics, and the Thompson/CDA/Spectrum files. Our regression sample consists 
of 6,286 firm-year observations. Some items in the table are lagged in our regressions, and this results in the small variation in 
observation number reported here. All dollar amounts are in 2012 U.S. dollars. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
 
Variable N Mean 5th Pctl Median 95th Pctl Std. Dev. 
Avg. Director Pay ($, thousands) 6,286 186.438 58.686 173.913 360.308 97.033 
Avg. Director Equity Based Pay  6,286 0.506 0.000 0.521 0.820 0.206 
Institutional Ownership 6,286 0.789 0.511 0.807 1.000 0.147 
Active Inst. Ownership 6,286 0.566 0.321 0.573 0.772 0.135 
Passive Inst. Ownership 6,286 0.223 0.118 0.219 0.339 0.067 
Return on Assets 6,286 0.043 -0.080 0.044 0.159 0.082 
12 Month Stock Return (%) 6,286 8.689 -51.978 6.864 75.947 40.279 
Market Value of Assets ($,millions) 6,286 18,306.590 450.385 4,453.680 81,326.900 44,143.280 
Standard Deviation of Stock Returns (%) 6,286 10.517 4.952 9.949 18.372 4.209 
Book to Market 6,286 0.737 0.289 0.743 1.142 0.268 
Board Size 6,286 9.429 6.000 9.000 13.000 2.284 
Independence 6,286 0.787 0.571 0.800 0.917 0.108 
Proportion Female 6,286 0.122 0.000 0.111 0.300 0.099 
Finance Experience 6,286 0.132 0.000 0.111 0.375 0.125 
Average Director Age 6,286 62.289 56.143 62.400 68.167 3.568 
Busyness 6,286 0.819 0.077 0.778 1.700 0.495 
Avg. Director Ownership 6,286 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.028 0.011 
Classified Board Indicator 6,286 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
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 Table 2.2 - Regression of total director pay 
This table reports coefficients from a regression model explaining average total director pay. As 
explanatory variables, we use the lagged proportion of institutional ownership in the firm as well 
as other firm and board characteristics. The model adjusts for year and industry fixed effects. 
Reported p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. All variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
Dependent variable is Average Total Director Pay (thousands of 2012 dollars, log) 
 Coefficient p-value 
Institutional Ownership (proportion,t-1) 0.519 (0.000) 
Return on Assets -0.503 (0.000) 
12-month return (%) 0.001 (0.000) 
Market Value (mill., log, t-1) 0.194 (0.000) 
Standard Deviation of Returns (%) 0.011 (0.000) 
Book-to-market (log, t-1) -0.080 (0.015) 
Board size (log, t-1) -0.072 (0.203) 
Board independence (proportion, t-1) 0.132 (0.178) 
Board gender (proportion female, t-1) -0.141 (0.180) 
Board financial experience (proportion, t-1) 0.058 (0.439) 
Board member age (t-1) -0.003 (0.321) 
Board busyness (t-1) 0.086 (0.000) 
Board ownership (proportion, t-1) -5.009 (0.000) 
Classified board (t-1) 0.018 (0.338) 
Intercept Suppressed   
Fixed effects Year, Industry 
Cluster Firm 
Adjusted R-squared 43.19% 
Number of Observations 6,286 
Years 2006-2012 
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 Table 2.3 - Regression of equity based compensation 
This table reports coefficients from a regression model explaining the average proportion of 
equity based compensation that directors receive. As explanatory variables, we use the lagged 
proportion of institutional ownership in the firm as well as other firm and board characteristics. 
The model adjusts for year and industry fixed effects. Reported p-values are based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
 
Dependent variable is average proportion of Equity Based Compensation 
 Coefficient p-value 
Institutional Ownership (proportion,t-1) 0.171 (0.000) 
Return on Assets  -0.177 (0.000) 
12-month return (%) 0.000 (0.000) 
Market Value (mill., log, t-1) 0.019 (0.000) 
Standard Deviation of Returns (%) 0.004 (0.001) 
Book-to-market (log, t-1) -0.117 (0.000) 
Board size (log, t-1) -0.009 (0.679) 
Board independence (proportion, t-1) 0.151 (0.000) 
Board gender (proportion female, t-1) -0.116 (0.011) 
Board financial experience (proportion, t-1) 0.000 (0.993) 
Board member age (t-1) -0.008 (0.000) 
Board busyness (t-1) 0.030 (0.004) 
Board ownership (proportion, t-1) -1.301 (0.004) 
Classified board (t-1) -0.005 (0.513) 
Intercept Suppressed   
Fixed effects Year, Industry 
Cluster Firm 
Adjusted R-squared 27.77% 
Number of Observations 6,286 
Years 2006-2012 
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 Table 2.4 - Test for ownership type 
This table reports coefficients from a regression model explaining average total director pay and 
the average proportion of equity based compensation that directors receive. We include the 
lagged proportion of active and passive institutional ownership as our main explanatory variables 
as well as other firm and board characteristics. The model adjusts for year and industry fixed 
effects. Reported p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. F-test  
[F(1,1452)] tests the equality of the coefficients of active and passive institutional ownership. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable Log Total Compensation  EBC 
 Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Active Inst. Ownership ( proportion ,t-1) 0.557 (0.000)  0.195 (0.000) 
Passive Inst. Ownership ( proportion ,t-1) 0.370 (0.014)  0.084 (0.189) 
Return on Assets  -0.491 (0.000)  -0.169 (0.000) 
12-month return (%) 0.001 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Market Value (mill., log, t-1) 0.196 (0.000)  0.020 (0.000) 
Standard Deviation of Returns (%) 0.011 (0.000)  0.004 (0.001) 
Book-to-market (log, t-1) -0.078 (0.017)  -0.116 (0.000) 
Board size (log, t-1) -0.069 (0.224)  -0.007 (0.747) 
Board independence (proportion, t-1) 0.132 (0.178)  0.151 (0.000) 
Board gender (proportion female, t-1) -0.142 (0.177)  -0.116 (0.011) 
Board financial experience (proportion, t-1) 0.056 (0.452)  -0.001 (0.979) 
Board member age (t-1) -0.003 (0.313)  -0.008 (0.000) 
Board busyness (t-1) 0.087 (0.000)  0.031 (0.004) 
Board ownership (proportion, t-1) -5.091 (0.000)  -1.344 (0.003) 
Classified board (t-1) 0.018 (0.343)  -0.005 (0.505) 
      
F-test: Active = Passive Prob. > F =    0.2397  Prob. > F =    0.1070 
      
Intercept Suppressed      
Fixed effects Year, Industry  Year, Industry 
Cluster Firm  Firm 
Adjusted R-squared 43.21%  27.86% 
Number of Observations 6,286  6,286 
Years 2006-2012  2006-2012 
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Table 2.5 - Instrumental variable regression 
This table reports coefficients from an instrumental variable regression model explaining average 
total director pay. The endogenous variable in this model is institutional ownership. We use each 
firm’s industry median value as the exogenous instrument. The model adjusts for year fixed 
effects in director pay. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
 OLS  First stage  Second stage 
Dependent variable Log Total Comp.  Inst. Own. (t-1)  Log Total Comp. 
 Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
Institutional ownership (t-1) 0.486 (0.000)     0.573 (0.000) 
Inst. Own. size/ind. median (t-1) 0.030 (0.591)  0.351 (0.000)    
Log total pay size/ind. med. (t-1) 0.400 (0.000)  0.028 (0.000)  0.398 (0.000) 
Return on assets (%) -0.521 (0.000)  -0.066 (0.010)  -0.515 (0.000) 
12-month return (%) 0.001 (0.000)  0.000 (0.040)  0.001 (0.000) 
Market value (log, t-1) 0.111 (0.000)  -0.016 (0.000)  0.113 (0.000) 
Standard dev. returns (%) 0.012 (0.000)  0.003 (0.000)  0.011 (0.000) 
Book-to-martket (log, t-1) -0.127 (0.000)  -0.022 (0.000)  -0.125 (0.000) 
Board size (log, t-1) -0.146 (0.000)  -0.100 (0.000)  -0.137 (0.000) 
Board ind. (%, t-1) 0.193 (0.001)  0.097 (0.000)  0.185 (0.001) 
Board gender (% fem., t-1) -0.104 (0.095)  -0.034 (0.066)  -0.101 (0.106) 
Board fin. exp. (%, t-1) 0.066 (0.137)  0.057 (0.000)  0.061 (0.175) 
Board member age (t-1) -0.003 (0.056)  -0.002 (0.000)  -0.003 (0.084) 
Board busyness (t-1) 0.143 (0.000)  0.017 (0.000)  0.142 (0.000) 
Board ownership (%, t-1) -4.604 (0.000)  -2.577 (0.000)  -4.381 (0.000) 
Classified board (t-1) 0.013 (0.245)  -0.002 (0.479)  0.013 (0.237) 
Intercept Suppressed Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects Year  Year  Year 
Cluster No  No  No 
Adj. R-squared 36.87%     
Centered R-squared   27.36%  37.04% 
Number of Observations 6,286  6,286  6,286 
Years 2006-2012  2006-2012  2006-2012 
         
Weak Instrument Tests         
First stage F-statistic    460.270 (0.000)    
Anderson-Rubin F-statistic    13.250 (0.000)    
C-D Wald F-statistic    460.270     
S-Y 10% critical value    16.380     
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 ESSAY THREE: DOES IT MATTER HOW FIRMS APPORTION DIRECTOR 
INCENTIVES? EVIDENCE FROM ACQUISITIONS 
 
1. Introduction 
How best to provide outside directors with incentives to monitor and govern the firm?  
Financial economists interested in this question (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983) have identified 
two main sources of director incentives: reputation in the market for directors and direct 
incentives from compensation.  Yermack (2004) estimates that equity-based compensation, such 
as shares of stock and stock options, “account for more than half of total director incentives, with 
most of the balance related to the increased possibility of obtaining more board seats if the firm 
performs well” (p. 2282).1 
The major role of equity-based compensation in motivating outside directors necessitates 
a detailed understanding of how firms award such compensation and of its effects on the firm.  
To date, studies on director incentives keep the focus on the board as a whole, thus analyzing 
variations in aggregate incentives across different boards, while variations within each board are 
overlooked (see, for example Yermack, 2004; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Linn and Park, 2005). 
This study contributes to the literature by first examining how incentives are awarded 
within the board.  We find that, when structuring incentive compensation packages for outside 
1 Director incentives from equity-based compensation, while substantially lower than the corresponding incentives 
of CEOs, are economically significant (e.g., Yermack, 2004).  Furthermore, Adams and Ferreira (2008) find that 
even small amounts of financial incentives motivate outside directors to act in the interests of the shareholders. 
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 directors, firms take one of two distinct approaches: an equal incentives approach or a variable 
incentives approach.2  Firms following the equal incentives approach grant equal annual 
incentive compensation to each and every outside director serving on the board.  For example, in 
2012 3M awarded an amount of $130,000 worth of stock to each and every outside director, 
while varying the cash retainer conditional on a director’s activities within the board (see Table 
A1 in Appendix A).  Firms following the variable incentives approach grant annual incentive 
compensation that varies across directors.  Variable incentives firms can have more complicated 
schedules for determining outside director incentive compensation.  As shown in Table A1, 
Monsanto and Oracle both used compensation policies that led to variable incentives across their 
outside directors for 2012.  Monsanto granted pay according to committee participation and 
leadership with all compensation to be evenly divided between cash and stock.  Oracle also 
allocated total pay according to committee membership; however, instead of specifying a 
percentage value, a share number was used conditional on each director’s activities within the 
board, and the value was determined ex post.3 
From an optimality standpoint, a case could be made both for the equal incentives 
approach and for the variable incentives approach.  On one hand, all outside members of the 
board, while heterogeneous in their experiences and skills, bear equal responsibility for 
monitoring and governing the firm, and all directors are considered equals when it comes to 
certain decisions.  For example, such is the case when votes are taken at the board level rather 
than at the committee level.  Unlike the hierarchy that exists among firm executives, each 
member of the board may have equal influence over general business decisions, and the firm’s 
2 There are relatively few firms in our sample that do not grant any incentive compensation to the board. 
3 Farrell, Friesen, and Hersch (2008) refer to these schedules as fixed-value and fixed-number equity grants, 
respectively.  In addition, it is not uncommon for firms to allow directors some choice in how their compensation is 
structured.  Such is the case in both Monsanto, which we would classify as a variable incentives firm, and 3M, 
which appears to grant ex ante equal equity-based incentives to all directors. 
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 interests may best be served when outside directors receive equal incentives.  In this 
environment, unequal incentive compensation may reduce overall board function.4   
On the other hand, a wide body of literature argues that the most talented decision makers 
should, ceteris paribus, receive the most incentives.  For example, the talent assignment model of 
Gabaix and Landier (2008) predicts that the most talented managers should be assigned to the 
largest firms, thus producing the highest marginal products of effort and consequently receiving 
the largest compensation packages as a reward.  In such an environment, Edmans, Gabaix, and 
Landier (2009) show that, for a given cost of effort, an increase in total compensation predicts 
higher dollar values for the performance based portion of compensation.  Applying the same 
logic to the assignment of directors to board activities within the firm predicts that the most 
talented directors should (i) be most active within the firm and thus receive the highest 
compensation and (ii) receive the most incentives for performance.  Resonating with this logic, 
Oracle’s 2012 proxy, for example, states that “(a)nnual cash retainers and formula stock option 
grants to the non-employee directors are intended to correlate to the responsibilities of each such 
director.”5 
We construct a base sample of 14,464 firm-year observations from 2006 to 2013 to study 
board compensation and incentive structures.  Firms in this sample tend to use stable 
compensation strategies for the board.  Those firms that do not grant their directors any incentive 
compensation in one year continue to not grant incentive compensation to any board members in 
the following year over 64% of the time.  Similarly, firms that utilize either equal or variable 
4 To better understand board function, Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) examine the minutes of board meetings 
and board committee meetings of eleven firms.  They find that for most of the time boards take on a “supervisory” 
role, as in the approaches of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Almazan and Suarez (2003), and Raheja (2005).  
However, in a significant number of situations, boards also take on a “managerial” role as in the approaches of Song 
and Thakor (2006), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and Harris and Raviv (2008). 
5 See Table A1. 
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 within-board incentive strategies in one year continue to use the same incentive strategy in the 
following year in the majority of cases.  Further, for firms that use varying levels of incentives 
for directors within the board, the rank correlation between cash and incentive compensation 
within boards is positive on average and tends to continue to be either positive or negative from 
one year to the next in the majority of cases.   
The second objective of this study is to examine whether and how the structure of 
director incentive compensation within the boards of acquiring firms affects the performance of 
corporate acquisitions, where acquisition performance is measured by the acquirer’s stock return 
around the acquisition announcement.  Corporate acquisitions provide suitable grounds for 
testing board performance for several reasons.  Acquisitions usually represent significant 
expenditures in relation to firm value and, as such, are subject to board approval.  One of the 
responsibilities of the board, for example, is to ensure that a proposed acquisition complements 
the overall strategy of the firm and that it is in the best interest of the firm’s shareholders.  Many 
studies have offered merger and acquisition performance as an appropriate environment to 
measure the influence of the board of directors and of governance on firm decisions.  Byrd and 
Hickman (1992) find that firms with majority independent boards have higher abnormal 
acquisition returns than other bidders.  Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) study a sample of 3,333 
completed acquisitions from 1990 through 2003 and find that abnormal acquisition returns are 
negatively correlated with antitakeover provisions.  Bebchuck, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) find 
that firms where CEO pay is high relative to other top management experience lower 
announcement returns. Lin, Officer, and Zou (2011) study the effects of director and officer 
liability insurance and find that firms that have higher levels of D&O insurance also pay higher 
premiums during acquisitions and experience lower post-merger ROA. 
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 Using a collection of 2,239 acquisitions made by firms in our base sample, we find that 
the allocation of director incentives within the board has a significant effect on acquirer 
performance.  Firms that give all directors equal incentive compensation have five-day 
announcement window returns 0.963% higher than firms that vary director incentive levels 
within the board.   Higher levels of average director total compensation are associated with lower 
announcement window returns in our test sample.  These results are robust to changes in the 
length of the announcement window and a multi-year incentive strategy classification scheme. 
As noted in Lin, Officer, and Zou (2011), the question of endogeneity is perhaps less problematic 
here than in other areas of corporate finance since the announcement window return is a very 
short duration market-based measure.  Also, as incentive compensation strategies are relatively 
stable from year to year in our sample, the concern for endogeneity between compensation 
structure and any particular acquisition is low, as the compensation package is similar even in 
non-acquisition years.   
Our work is related to the literature studying the determinants of director compensation 
and incentives.  Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that total director compensation and the 
proportion of equity-based compensation granted to directors decreases in the presence of 
entrenched managers.  Yermack (2004) finds that pay-performance sensitivities for outside 
directors are lower than for CEOs.  However, the financial incentives generated by director 
equity holdings are much larger than those generated by reputational concerns, which was the 
focus of earlier literature on director incentives.  Farrell, Friesen, and Hersch (2008) find a trend 
towards firms using fixed-value rather than fixed-number equity compensation from 1998-2004.  
Nguyen (2014) concludes that firms use meeting fees and equity-based compensation as 
substitutes and that meeting fees lead to more active boards.  Fedaseyeu, Linck, and Wagner 
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 (2014) show that outside director total compensation increases with director skills, committee 
involvement, and experience.  Our paper contributes to the above literature by studying the 
allocation of incentives within the board rather than attempting to model the determinants of 
individual director or board-level compensation.    
Our findings have implications for the literature on director incentives, the literature on 
the relation between corporate governance and firm performance, the literature on the 
performance of mergers and acquisitions which has mostly focused on the role of the CEO while 
ignoring the board, and the literature examining the overall relevance of the board of directors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains information about 
the construction and attributes of our sample. Section 3 describes the way firms in our sample 
structure director compensation. Section 4 studies the effects of these compensation structures on 
acquisition performance, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Sample 
2.1 Base sample 
The base sample for our study comes from the Execucomp Directorcomp file.  We 
examine all firms with more than one director listed in the Directorcomp database.  The sample 
is restricted to include only directors for which Directorcomp lists a positive total compensation 
and where the total compensation is within $1,000 of the sum of the listed compensation 
components6.   We find 14,698 firm-years in Directorcomp that meet these criteria. 
We then match this sample to Compustat for market capitalization data, constructed as 
the end of year stock price multiplied by shares outstanding.  This requirement reduces the 
6 Total_Sec = sum(Cash_Fees,Stock_Awards,Option_Awards,Noneq_Incent,Pension_Chg,Othcomp). 
80 
 
                                                          
 sample to 14,464 firm-year observations spanning from 2006 to 2013.  All dollar values are 
converted to 2013 U.S. dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index. 
For our preliminary analysis, we construct variables for firm board size, average director 
total pay, and the average level of director incentives as a percentage of total pay.  Because only 
outside directors receive compensation listed in the Directorcomp file, our measure of board size 
is the number of outside directors on a firm’s board in a given year.  The average director total 
pay is the simple average of the total listed compensation for all directors of a firm during the 
year.  For each director within a firm, we calculate incentive compensation as the sum of the 
value of stock awards, option awards, and non-equity incentives for the year.  Dividing this 
incentive level by the director’s total pay for the year gives the incentive percentage for the 
director, and we average this within the board to form the average director incentive level for 
that firm-year. 
In Panel A of Table 3.1, we see that the median firm in our sample has a market 
capitalization of $1.84 billion and has a board which consists of 8 members. Each board member 
receives $170.45 thousand in total compensation per year, with 50.67% of this total being 
comprised of incentivizing compensation. 
2.2 Test sample 
The testing sample contains data on acquisitions undertaken during our sample time 
period.  We collect all acquisitions available from the SDC Platinum database.  We follow the 
methodology of Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) and limit our sample to only completed mergers 
with a deal value of over $1,000,000 as reported in SDC.  Further, we require that the reported 
deal value be over 1% of the bidding firm’s end of year market capital for the fiscal year of the 
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 acquisition.  The bidding firm must have owned less than 50% of the target firm prior to the 
acquisition, and the bidder must own 100% of the target following the acquisition. 
Our main variable of interest is the 5-day (-2,+2) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
the bidding firm during the acquisition announcement window.  Because the CAR is market 
adjusted, our sample requires that bidding firms have price information available from CRSP 
during the announcement window and at least 100 days of pricing information during the 200 
day (-210,-11) estimation period.  We match our firm compensation and financial data to 
acquisitions which occurred during the appropriate fiscal year.  The final testing sample contains 
2,239 acquisitions between 2006 and 2013 conducted by firms for which we have full 
compensation, financial, and stock return data7. 
Descriptive statistics for the acquisition sample can be found in Table 3.5 Panel A.  The 
median bidder in our test sample has a market capitalization of $1.91 billion, a board consisting 
of 8 outside directors, and pays its directors an average of $178.55 thousand, 53.07% of which is 
in incentive pay.  We see that acquiring firms tend to be slightly larger than the median firms in 
our base sample, and they tend to give their directors slightly higher total pay and slightly higher 
proportions of incentive pay. 
3. Structure of Director Pay 
3.1 Firm types 
Firms’ strategies with respect to incentive pay can be categorized into three groups, 
outlined in Table 3.1.  Approximately 6% (865 firm-year observations) of our sample consists of 
firms that do not grant any directors any form of incentive compensation, as shown in Panel B.  
7 We remove the 2013 acquisition of WorkflowOne by Standard Register from our sample due to a five-day 
announcement CAR  of 367%. 
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 These firms tend to be the smallest firms and grant the lowest levels of pay in the sample.  No-
incentive firms have a median market capitalization of $1.11 billion and pay directors median of 
$75.02 thousand per year, compared to the median firm in the full sample which has market 
capitalization of $1.84 billion and pays directors $170.45 thousand per year. 
The next distinct strategy firms take regarding incentives is to grant an equal incentive 
structure to all directors, summarized in Panel C.  That is, firms give each director of the firm 
identical, non-zero levels of incentive pay.  These types of firms compose 26% (3,811 firm-year 
observations) of our sample, and they tend to have smaller boards, with a median board size of 7 
directors compared to the full sample median of 8 directors per board.  Equal incentive firms 
have a median market capitalization of $1.60 billion which is also smaller than the full sample 
median, however they grant a similar level of total pay with a sub-sample median of $170.19 
thousand per director.  Additionally, because these firms do grant incentives, we can measure the 
average proportion of pay that directors receive in incentive compensation for this sub-sample.  
The average proportion of incentive pay is not highly skewed in our sample, and directors of 
equal incentive firms on average receive 52.01% of their total compensation in incentives, which 
is very similar to variable incentive structure firms.  The full sample average for this variable is a 
less apt comparison and biased on the low end, since it contains many observations for firms 
which pay directors no incentives at all. 
Firms which pay directors variable levels of incentives make up the remaining 68% 
(9,788 firm-year observations) of our base sample, finalized in Panel D of Table 3.1.  These 
firms pay at least some of their directors non-zero levels of incentives, however not all the 
directors of the firm receive identical levels of incentives.  Variable incentive firms tend to be 
larger than average, with a median market capitalization of $2.07 billion.  However, variable 
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 incentive firms are not substantially different from equal incentive firms with regards to director 
compensation. The median variable incentive firm pays its directors $177.4 thousand of which 
51.59% is incentives.  
We also classify the bidder firms in our test sample using the same categorization 
scheme.  As shown in Panel B of Table 3.5, bidders that do not use incentive pay form 3.6% (81 
observations) of the acquisition sample.  These firms have a median board size of 9 directors, 
market capitalization of $1.22 billion, and give a median of $69.88 thousand to their directors in 
average total compensation.  This level of total compensation is quite low compared to the other 
firms in our sample. 
Panel C of Table 3.5 summarizes bidders that use a equal incentive scheme for their 
board, which represents 25.5% (570 observations) of our test sample.  These firms have a median 
firm size of $1.88 billion, slightly smaller boards consisting of a median of 7 directors, and 
median total compensation of $187.79 thousand per director, 54.18% of which is given through 
incentive pay.  
Finally, in Panel D, we find that variable incentive bidders in our test sample tend to be 
relatively large, with a median market capitalization of $1.99 billion.  These firms have a median 
board size of 8 outside directors, and pay their directors a median of $179.40 thousand, 53.74% 
of which is incentives.  Variable incentive bidders make up the final 70.9% (1,588 observations) 
of our sample of acquisitions. 
 Overall, the sample of acquisitions tends to follow similar distributions as the base 
sample, with the exception that firms tend to be a little larger.  This is unsurprising as, all else 
equal, larger firms would be expected to perform more acquisitions than smaller firms. 
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 3.2 Correlation of incentives and total pay 
Our starting view of director compensation is rooted in the idea that the board of directors 
is a team of equals.  A common descriptive is that all directors start with the same base retainer 
fee and are paid extra fees for attending meetings and chairing or serving on committees.  Within 
this framework, the highest paid director for a firm will be the one with the most access to the 
decision making processes of the board and its committees.  Given this inference that the highest 
paid directors would have the most influence within the board, we would expect that the highest 
paid directors should also be the most heavily incentivized to perform in the firm’s best interest.  
A positive correlation should therefore exist between the level of incentive pay a director 
receives and the level of cash pay that director receives.  More specifically, this view suggests 
that there should be an order where the highest paid director within a board should also be the 
director with the highest value of incentive compensation.  We examine this incentive alignment 
problem with Spearman rank-correlation coefficients measured between the ranks of cash fees 
and incentive levels within the firm.  Without variation in both cash fees and incentive levels 
among board members, correlations between the two variables do not exist, and so we can only 
calculate rank-correlations for the variable incentive sub-sample of firms. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the annual distribution of the Spearman correlations for the 
variable incentive firms in our sample.  The median firm in our sample has experienced a slight 
increase in the rank correlation between cash fees and incentive levels throughout our sample 
time span, with an average value of 0.35, showing that, for most firms, those directors receiving 
higher levels of cash fees within the firm also receive higher levels of incentive pay.   
We further divide the variable incentive sample to examine the differences between firms 
that appear to align the rankings of cash and incentive pay for directors and those firms that do 
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 not.  Table 3.3 provides detail on the average level of director total compensation, average 
market capitalization, and average percentage incentive pay for the variable incentive firms in 
our sample.  Firms with zero or negative rank correlation between cash and incentive rankings 
make up approximately one third of the variable incentive sub-sample, but do not appear to be 
substantially different from those firms which have positive rank correlations with respect to 
incentive levels, firm size, or total director compensation. 
Moving to our test sample, we see in Table 3.6 that the distribution of Spearman 
correlations in the bidder firms is similar to that in the base sample, with a positive median 
correlation of 0.37.   
Table 3.7 compares positive rank correlation firms and negative or zero correlation firms.  
Again, the bidders in this sub-sample are all variable incentive firms.  Zero or negative rank 
correlation firms make up approximately one third of our acquisition sample.  These firms 
appear to be larger than the positive rank correlation bidders in the sample, with an average 
market capitalization of $11.32 billion compared to $8.84 billion for positive correlation firms.  
Correspondingly, the zero or negative rank correlation firms in the test sample pay their directors 
higher total compensation, with a median value of $200.47 thousand per director, which is 
slightly higher than the $195.12 thousand paid by positive correlation firms.  The zero or 
negative bidders also use higher proportions of incentives, with 58.53% of total pay being paid in 
incentives on average compared to an average of 51.20% for positive rank correlation bidders. 
3.3 Contingency analysis 
In order to make claims about how a firm’s compensation structure affects director 
performance, one must first show that firms are actually utilizing a consistent strategy when 
setting director compensation.  One source of evidence that firms do not randomly assign 
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 director pay structure is to examine how firms change from one year to the next.  We perform 
contingency analysis to see if firms choose their incentive variation strategy and rank 
correlations randomly each year or if these characteristics are persistent. 
Table 3.4 summarizes the changes from one year to the next for our base sample of firms.  
In Panel A, firm incentive structure classification in one year is associated with the incentive 
structure that firm uses in the next year.  Firms that do not use incentive pay in one year also do 
not use any incentive pay during the next year in 64% of cases.  Equal incentive firms persist in 
their strategy during the next year in 53% of cases, and variable incentive firms continue in 
almost 75% of cases.  A chi-square test for independence shows that this persistence is highly 
significant, and it does not appear that firms are randomly choosing to use or vary incentives.   
Panel B of Table 3.4 summarizes a similar test on the variable incentive firms in our 
sample.  Firms in this table are classified according to their Spearman rank correlation.  Firms 
with a positive rank correlation in one year continue to have a positive rank correlation during 
the next year over 57% of the time, and firms with zero or negative rank correlations continue in 
over 66% of cases.  The chi-square test for independence shows that this persistence in rank 
correlations is highly significant.  The combination of these two tests supports the idea that firms 
are utilizing purposeful, persistent strategies when setting director compensation.   
4. Acquisition Announcement Returns 
4.1 Control variables 
We follow the methodology used in Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) to construct the 
controls for our acquisition announcement return regressions.  We broadly separate our control 
variables into two groups, bidder characteristics and deal characteristics, to capture information 
that may influence announcement returns for acquirers. In addition to the previously mentioned 
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 board size and market capitalization variables, we also calculate Tobin’s q, free cash flow as a 
percentage of total assets, and leverage for the bidder characteristics8.  From the SDC data, we 
calculate the relative deal size and formulate dummy variables to identify high-tech-industry 
bidders and the target’s status as a public, private, or subsidiary firm.  We also create dummy 
indicators to identify each deal as all-cash or stock financed. 
Several variables used in our controls contain significant outlying observations that may 
distort our results.  We take the natural logarithm of market capitalization to adjust for non-
normality.  Also, we winsorize all variables in the sample at the 1st and 99th percentile, with the 
exception of the dependent CAR variables, dummy variables, rank correlations, and the incentive 
proportions.  
Table 3.8 summarizes the test sample used in our analysis.  The median five-day CAR in 
the sample is 0.709%, suggesting that acquisitions during this time period were generally 
received favorably by the bidding firms’ investors.  There was no appreciable stock price runup 
for the average firm, with a median estimation period CAR of 0.000%.  Values for Tobin’s q, 
free cash flow, and leverage are all comparable to values found in the sample of Masulis, Wang, 
and Xie (2007), thus the firms in our sample do not appear to be extraordinary in any way.  The 
deals in our sample also appear to be fairly typical.  The targets are about 6% of the size of the 
bidder for the median deal.  Most targets appear to be private firms, and a majority of acquirers 
finance the deals using only cash. 
4.2 Regression results 
Evaluating board performance can be a difficult proposition.  Many firm performance 
measures are primarily driven by manager and employee efforts, and using such measures is a 
8 The Appendix provides detailed variable descriptions. 
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 very noisy signal of board quality.  In order to better estimate the performance of the board, 
outcomes that are directly influenced by the decisions of the board are preferred.  Acquisitions 
have the ability to quickly create or destroy value for the firm, and merger and acquisition 
activity typically requires board approval unless the deal value is relatively insignificant.  Thus, 
we focus on the market perception of firm acquisitions as our primary test of board performance. 
Our primary variables of concern are dummy indicators for director compensation 
structure (equal or variable incentives), the natural log of total pay per bidder director, the within 
firm coefficient of variation for director total pay, the average level of incentive pay for bidder 
firms, and the bidder Spearman rank correlation between cash fees and incentive pay for 
directors.  These variables capture several dimensions through which firms may attempt to 
influence director behavior through compensation policy. 
The results from our main regressions are found in Table 3.9.  All regressions control for 
year fixed effects with robust standard errors corrected for firm level clustering.  Regression (1) 
uses only incentive structure dummies, with variable incentives being the base comparison case.  
Acquisitions by equal incentive firms have a 0.975% higher average CAR over the five-day 
announcement window compared to acquisitions by firms with variable director incentives.  This 
coefficient is highly statistically significant, and it is also quite large economically, given that the 
average acquisition in our sample has a CAR of 0.956%.  Acquisitions by firms that do not use 
incentive compensation for their directors do not perform significantly differently than 
acquisitions by variable incentive firms.  Regression (2) includes our other compensation 
characteristics, and the coefficient for the equal incentive dummy increases to 1.079%.  Of the 
other compensation factors, only the log of director total compensation appears to significantly 
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 affect announcement returns.  Bidders with more highly paid boards appear to have significantly 
lower CARs over the five-day announcement window. 
Regressions (3) and (4) add our bidder and deal characteristics to control for factors 
known to influence acquisition announcement returns.  The equal incentive coefficient remains 
economically large and statistically significant at the 5% level, and the log of director pay 
remains marginally significant in the full model of regression (4).   
Our results suggest that the structure and level of board pay can affect the quality of 
board decisions as measured by the market reaction to the announcement of acquisitions.  
Acquisitions by firms that use equal incentive structures appear to be perceived as value creating, 
while acquisitions made by firms with more highly paid boards are associated with poorer 
market perceptions.  We do not find that the variability of pay within the board or the rank 
correlation between cash and incentive pay for a board have any significant effects on acquisition 
announcement returns. 
4.3 Robustness testing 
In our first robustness test, we perform regressions on a wider eleven-day announcement 
window.  Table 3.10 contains the results of these tests which largely mirror those found in our 
previous analysis.  Acquisitions by equal incentive firms show a large and statistically significant 
positive announcement return during the eleven-day window, and director total pay levels 
negatively influence CARs.  Further, in the longer window, the average incentive proportion for 
bidder directors appears to have a positive and marginally statistically significant effect on 
announcement returns.  It does not appear that our results are sensitive to the announcement 
window length that we have chosen for our tests. 
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 Our second concern is that our classifications of director incentive strategies may be 
wrong.  We classify firms as equal or variable incentive based on ex-post data.  Under our initial 
classification scheme, it only takes one director with a unique incentive level to lead to a variable 
incentive designation for a given firm.  Typically when a new director is added to the board, they 
receive a pro-rata allocation of cash fees and incentive pay rather than the normal annual 
incentive grants that the incumbent directors receive.  Thus, if a new director is added during the 
course of the year, director incentives may appear to be variable for the firm even though the 
company may actually follow an equal incentive strategy for typical grants.  A second issue is 
that changes in accounting rules may require firms to report value adjustments to past incentive 
grants for some directors, contributing to a variability in director pay that is not actually due to a 
strategic firm choice.  Both of these situations would lead to false classifications for firms as 
using a variable incentive structure when they may in fact be equal incentive structure firms.  
Our classification of equal incentive firms, on the other hand, is robust to these issues, as all 
directors must have exactly the same incentive levels in this classification.  
We develop an alternative classification scheme relying on two years of data to address 
these concerns.  Since the equal incentive classification is more reliable, we classify any firm 
that uses equal incentives in either year t or t-1 as an equal incentive structure firm.  To increase 
the certainty that variable incentive firms are classified correctly, we designate a firm as having a 
variable incentive structure only when that firm uses variable incentives in both year t and year t-
1.  Firms that did not use incentives for both years are classified as no incentive firms.  We lose 
405 observations compared to our earlier regression due to the requirement of two years of data 
for this secondary classification scheme. 
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 Regression (5) in Table 3.9 contains the results from this classification robustness test.  
For completeness, this regression also includes dummy variables to capture firms that have more 
ambiguous classifications, namely those that switched from variable to no incentives or from no 
incentives to variable incentives.  The classification coefficients in this regression are thus 
interpreted as acquisitions by each group of firms compared to the group of firms which used a 
variable incentive structure in both the current and previous year.  We find that our results are 
largely unchanged even when following this more strict classification system, as the coefficient 
for equal incentive firms shows that the acquisitions in this group had a five-day announcement 
window CAR 0.961% higher than the acquisitions made by variable incentive firms.  Testing the 
secondary classification scheme using [-5,+5] window CARs leads to similar results, as shown in 
regression (5) of Table 3.10.  The equal incentive coefficient in both of these regressions is 
highly statistically significant, and so we do not believe that errors in our classification system 
are influencing our results. 
5. Conclusion 
Our sample exhibits evidence that firms utilize consistent strategies when setting director 
compensation.  Firms that use equal, variable, or no incentives in one year are more likely to use 
that same strategy in the next year than switch to another strategy.  We study several measures 
related to the structure of compensation for boards, and find that the acquisitions made by firms 
that grant all of their outside directors equal incentives exhibit announcement window CARs 
0.963% higher than acquisitions made by firms that use variable incentives for their directors.  
Further, higher average levels of director pay are associated with lower CARs during the 
announcement window for all acquisitions.  We find these results even after controlling for 
bidder and deal characteristics known to influence announcement returns.  Our tests do not 
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 appear to be sensitive to the length of the announcement window used in our tests, nor do our 
results appear to be driven by spurious firm classifications. 
Because directors do not directly influence the day to day operations of the firms they 
oversee, it can be difficult to capture the impact they may have on firm value.  Our results 
demonstrate that directors do affect some firm policies, specifically policies regarding mergers 
and acquisitions.  Firms with equal incentive compensation policies for directors show much 
higher announcement day returns for acquisitions compared to firms with variable director 
incentives.  The structure of director incentives impacts the creation or destruction of firm value 
via acquisitions.  This research has implications for the literature in director compensation, 
mergers and acquisitions, incentive policy, and corporate governance. 
One important caveat of our findings is that we cannot reach a general conclusion that 
equal director incentives are always better than variable director incentives.  Decisions on 
corporate acquisitions usually involve all decision makers within the firm, the CEO as well as all 
directors, and therefore, providing equal incentives to all directors may optimize board 
performance.  However, it is possible that some board decisions depends only on a subset of all 
directors (for example, perhaps only directors serving on the auditing committee influence the 
choice of a “good” auditor).  In such circumstances, it may be optimal to apportion incentive 
compensation to better align the incentives of the relevant subset of directors.  Thus, the search 
for a one-size-fits-all incentive compensation structure for outside directors may be futile. 
One possible extension of our study is to examine why some firms may switch from one 
type of incentive policy to another, and what effects these policy changes may have on board 
functions.  Additionally, in this work we have crudely classified director compensation as cash 
and incentive based; however, a careful reading of proxy statements reveals a much more 
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 complex environment.  Firms may use various restrictions and deferments on cash, stock, and 
options which we have not examined here.  Some firms allow directors limited amounts of 
individual choice in the allocation of their pay among these various forms of compensation.  
Incorporating more detailed information to more precisely categorize firm compensation policies 
may lead to additional insights into board function. 
Finally, our work can be extended to other outcomes to determine what effects director 
compensation has on firm policies.  We have limited our study here to acquisition performance, 
but the board also influences firm decisions regarding CEO and executive compensation, 
turnover, and financial reporting.  Investigation in these areas of board influence would help 
form a more complete understanding of the influence of board compensation on firm behavior. 
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 Appendix A: Example Firms 
 
Table A1 
The table reports the 2012 director compensation structure for three companies: 3M, Monsanto, 
and Oracle.  The data is obtained from the DEF 14a filings of each firm. 
 
3M   
 Cash 
a Stock b 
   
Annual Retainer $115,000 $130,000 
Lead Director $25,000  
Chair   
Finance Committee $15,000  
Nominating and Governance Committee $15,000  
Audit Committee $20,000  
Compensation Committee $20,000  
   a Directors can choose between current cash, deferred cash, restricted stock, and deferred stock 
b Deferred stock    
Monsanto    
 Amount Cash 
a Stock b 
    
Annual Retainer $215,000 50% 50% 
Lead Director $25,000   
Chair    
Audit and Finance Committee $35,000 50% 50% 
Nominating and Governance Committee $25,000 50% 50% 
People and Compensation Committee $25,000 50% 50% 
Science and Technology Committee $20,000 50% 50% 
Sustainability and Corporate Responsibility Committee $20,000 50% 50% 
Member    
Audit and Finance Committee (excl chair) $15,000   
Nominating and Governance Committee (excl chair) $15,000 50% 50% 
People and Compensation Committee (excl chair) $15,000 50% 50% 
One-time Grant for New Directors c $195,000  100% 
    a Director can choose between current cash, deferred cash, restricted stock, and deferred stock 
b Deferred stock, except for new directors (footnote c) 
c Restricted stock that vests in 3 years     
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 Oracle a    
 Cash 
Options b 
(# of shares) 
Options 
($ value) 
    
Annual Retainer $52,500 45,000 $330,876 
Chair    
Audit and Finance Committee $25,000 45,000 $330,876 
Compensation Committee $25,000 45,000 $330,876 
Governance Committee $15,000 15,000 $110,292 
Independence Committee $15,000 15,000 $110,292 
Vice Chair    
Audit and Finance Committee  $25,000 30,000 $220,584 
Member    
Audit and Finance Committee $25,000   
Compensation Committee $25,000   
Governance Committee $15,000   
Independence Committee $15,000   
Fee per Board Meeting    
Regular Meeting $3,000   
Special Meeting $2,000   
Fee per Committee Meeting    
Audit and Finance Committee (earnings review meetings) $2,000   
Audit and Finance Committee (excl earnings review meetings) $3,000   
Compensation Committee (excl stock option grant meetings) $3,000   
Governance Committee $2,000   
Independence Committee $2,000   
One-time Grant for New Directors  60,000 $441,168 
    a The following is an excerpt from Oracle’s 2012 DEF 14a filing: “Annual cash retainers and formula 
stock option grants to the non-employee directors are intended to correlate to the responsibilities of each 
such director.” 
b Options vest 25% per year and are granted to directors serving for at least six months 
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 Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Description 
Main Sample (firm-year observations) 
Board size Number of directors with full compensation data in Execucomp’s Directorcomp file 
Market cap Market value of common stock (Compustat items PRCC_F time CSHO, if PRCC_F is missing then PRCC_C is used) 
Average director total pay Average of Directorcomp item Total_Sec within each firm-year 
Average director incentives 
Firm-year average of incentives divided by total pay, with incentive 
level calculated as the sum of Directorcomp stock_awards, 
option_awards, and noneq_incent.  
No Incentive Firms Firms which grant no director any incentive pay during the fiscal year 
Equal Incentive Firms Firms which grant all directors equal values of incentives during the fiscal year 
Variable Incentive Firms Firms which grant some or all directors incentives during the fiscal year, but the incentive values are not equal for all directors. 
Spearman rank correlation Firm-year Spearman rank correlation between director cash compensation and incentive compensation levels 
Director pay coefficient of variation Firm-year coefficient of variation of Directorcomp Total_Sec 
Test sample (acquisition observations) 
CAR [-2,+2] 
Five-day cumulative abnormal return for bidder calculated using the 
market model. Market model parameters are estimated over the [-
210,-11] period, with the CRSP equally-weighted return as the 
market index 
CAR [-5,+5] Ten-day cumulative abnormal return for bidder calculated using the market model   
Tobin’s q Bidder market value of assets (sum of Compustat AT,-CEQ, and market cap) divided by book value of assets (AT) 
Free cash flow Bidder (sum of Compustat items OIDBP, -XINT, -TXT,-CAPX) divided by total assets (AT) 
Leverage Bidder debt (Compustat item DLTT plus DLC )divided by assets (AT minus CEQ plus market cap) 
Stock price runup Percentage cumulative abnormal return in bidder stock price during pre-announcement estimation window [-210,-11] 
Relative deal size Deal size divided by end of fiscal year bidder market cap 
High tech firm Bidder Compustat SICH in (3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 5045, 4961, 7370, 7371, 7372, 7373) 
Public target Dummy variable: 1 for public targets, 0 otherwise from SDC 
Private target Dummy variable: 1 for private targets, 0 otherwise from SDC 
Subsidiary target Dummy variable: 1 for subsidiary targets, 0 otherwise from SDC 
All-cash deal Dummy variable: 1 for deals with only cash financing, 0 otherwise from SDC 
Stock deal Dummy variable: 1 for deals with at least partial stock financing, 0 otherwise from SDC 
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 Tables 
 
 
Table 3.1 - Descriptive Statistics 
The base sample originates with Execucomp.  We find 14,698 firm-year observations for firms with more than one outside director 
listed from 2006-2013. Requiring market capitalization data from Compustat reduces the sample to 14,464 firm-years, and this is our 
beginning sample of study.  Panel A reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of the variables measuring board size, market 
capitalization, average director total compensation, and the average percentage of total pay that is due to incentive compensation.  
Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of firm-year observations in which board members did not receive any 
incentive compensation.  Incentive compensation is defined as the sum of the value of restricted stock, option, and non-equity 
incentive compensation as reported in Execucomp.  Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of firm-years in which all 
directors receive identical positive values of incentive compensation for that firm-year.  Panel D reports descriptive statistics for the 
sub-sample of firm-years in which directors receive variable positive values of incentive compensation 
for that firm-year.  All dollar amounts are in 2013 U.S. dollars. 
 
Panel A. Full Sample 
   Board size  
Market cap 
(billions 2013 $US)  
Average director total pay 
(thousands 2013 $US)  
Average director incentives 
(% of total pay) 
                  
Year Obs.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev. 
                  
2006 1,587  8.37 8.00 2.80  9.86 2.32 29.82  184.52 153.23 171.03  47.48 49.39 28.18 
2007 2,019  8.16 8.00 2.79  9.15 1.81 28.89  183.58 156.79 136.75  47.87 50.68 26.63 
2008 1,936  8.11 8.00 2.79  5.76 1.15 20.14  177.20 158.00 114.93  46.04 49.86 53.91 
2009 1,888  8.14 8.00 2.73  6.95 1.50 21.19  175.26 156.92 116.20  46.64 48.45 22.13 
2010 1,860  8.18 8.00 2.70  8.12 1.91 23.93  187.27 173.48 118.99  48.88 50.84 21.22 
2011 1,804  8.21 8.00 2.63  8.02 1.77 24.56  193.18 181.84 108.12  50.49 51.76 20.58 
2012 1,749  8.31 8.00 2.59  9.16 1.99 29.07  194.28 182.15 112.25  50.48 51.69 19.44 
2013 1,621  8.46 8.00 2.61  11.87 2.80 32.80  200.60 192.82 102.05  51.62 52.44 18.70 
All 14,464   8.23 8.00 2.71   8.52 1.84 26.48   186.62 170.45 124.01   48.61 50.67 28.94 
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 Panel B. No Incentive Firms  
   Board size  
Market cap 
(billions 2013 $US)  
Average director total pay 
(thousands 2013 $US)   
                  
Year Obs.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.     
                  
2006 99  7.47 7.00 3.27  6.12 1.41 21.18  83.45 64.42 74.34     
2007 126  7.70 8.00 3.03  6.78 0.97 28.10  87.66 71.60 58.37     
2008 93  7.90 8.00 2.80  5.47 0.63 22.78  91.33 72.80 68.24     
2009 133  7.65 7.00 2.85  6.06 0.86 24.33  90.75 72.10 67.37     
2010 136  7.70 7.00 3.28  6.23 1.03 25.59  96.94 77.53 73.60     
2011 109  7.76 8.00 3.13  7.92 1.08 30.67  100.12 78.75 70.69     
2012 94  7.74 8.00 2.79  10.58 1.23 35.42  104.39 80.07 72.52     
2013 75  7.95 8.00 3.04  14.13 1.93 44.45  108.39 89.92 75.81     
All 865  7.72 8.00 3.03  7.56 1.11 29.00  94.69 75.02 69.96     
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 Panel C. Equal Dollar Incentive Firms 
   Board size  
Market cap 
(billions 2013 $US)  
Average director total pay 
(thousands 2013 $US)  
Average director incentives 
(% of total pay) 
                  
Year Obs.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev. 
                  
2006 245  7.14 7.00 2.34  6.16 1.89 14.06  163.96 144.14 105.63  49.30 48.18 19.65 
2007 315  6.91 7.00 2.45  7.29 1.60 23.54  174.26 144.24 119.64  49.35 50.15 19.43 
2008 321  6.92 7.00 2.47  5.03 0.90 19.78  164.43 146.81 109.05  48.33 48.38 19.20 
2009 588  7.30 7.00 2.43  5.23 1.29 14.06  174.60 154.87 124.23  49.45 50.23 17.01 
2010 625  7.29 7.00 2.36  5.55 1.61 13.12  184.28 172.18 95.49  53.24 53.32 15.24 
2011 601  7.18 7.00 2.30  6.33 1.51 23.23  191.82 175.56 100.83  53.93 52.78 15.14 
2012 562  7.35 7.00 2.21  6.12 1.71 15.65  190.50 182.92 84.88  53.10 52.55 13.97 
2013 554  7.48 7.00 2.27  9.88 2.52 30.33  202.53 194.11 99.61  54.96 53.67 13.84 
All 3,811  7.24 7.00 2.35  6.47 1.60 20.17  183.74 170.19 104.94  52.01 52.01 16.36 
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 Panel D. Variable Dollar Incentive Firms 
   Board size  
Market cap 
(billions 2013 $US)  
Average director total pay 
(thousands 2013 $US)  
Average director incentives 
(% of total pay) 
                  
Year Obs.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev. 
                  
2006 1,243  8.68 8.00 2.76  10.89 2.55 32.51  196.62 161.50 183.53  50.90 51.34 27.31 
2007 1,578  8.44 8.00 2.76  9.71 1.96 29.90  193.10 164.65 141.31  51.40 52.54 25.23 
2008 1,522  8.38 8.00 2.78  5.93 1.24 20.05  185.15 167.09 116.07  48.37 51.70 59.02 
2009 1,167  8.62 8.00 2.75  7.91 1.73 23.61  185.22 169.43 112.49  50.53 49.49 19.48 
2010 1,099  8.74 9.00 2.66  9.82 2.32 28.01  200.14 183.21 130.16  52.45 51.99 17.63 
2011 1,094  8.82 9.00 2.56  8.96 2.07 24.56  203.19 190.35 110.65  53.63 52.67 17.39 
2012 1,093  8.85 9.00 2.60  10.60 2.38 33.36  203.96 186.97 123.39  53.47 52.74 16.51 
2013 992  9.05 9.00 2.59  12.80 3.08 33.08  206.50 196.69 101.88  53.67 52.98 15.89 
All 9,788  8.67 8.00 2.70  9.40 2.07 28.30  195.86 177.74 131.03  51.59 52.06 30.19 
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 Table 3.2 - Annual distribution of rank correlations firms with variable incentives 
This table reports the annual distribution of the Spearman rank correlation between cash 
compensation and incentive compensation for directors within each firm-year observation.  Rank 
correlations are zero for all firm-years in which firms either did not grant any director incentives 
or all directors received identical values of incentives, and thus only variable incentive structure 
firms are presented. 
 
Year Obs. 5th pctl 25th pctl 50th pctl 75th pctl 95th pctl Mean 
        
2006 1,243 -0.74 -0.15 0.32 0.61 0.87 0.21 
2007 1,578 -0.73 -0.11 0.32 0.64 0.88 0.22 
2008 1,522 -0.78 -0.18 0.31 0.65 0.87 0.20 
2009 1,167 -0.77 -0.31 0.34 0.61 0.86 0.17 
2010 1,099 -0.82 -0.34 0.35 0.61 0.83 0.15 
2011 1,094 -0.78 -0.27 0.41 0.62 0.85 0.19 
2012 1,093 -0.79 -0.26 0.41 0.62 0.86 0.19 
2013 992 -0.78 -0.16 0.45 0.63 0.86 0.23 
All 9,788 -0.78 -0.21 0.35 0.62 0.87 0.20 
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 Table 3.3 - Comparison correlations for firms with variable incentives 
Starting with the sub-sample of firm-years with variable incentive compensation structures, we 
classify firms based on their Spearman rank correlation.  There are 3,452 variable incentive firm-
year observations with a Spearman rank correlation that is less than or equal to zero, and there 
are 6,336 firm-year observations with positive Spearman rank correlations. This table provides 
annual averages of incentive percentage of total pay, market capitalization, and total director 
compensation for firms in each of these sub-samples. All dollar values are in 2013 U.S. dollars. 
 
Panel A. Firms with Zero or Negative Rank Correlation 
Year Obs. 
Average director 
incentives 
(% of total pay) 
Average market cap 
(billions 2013 $US) 
Average director  
total pay 
(thousands 2013 $US) 
     
2006 416 54.92 11.18 197.18 
2007 518 54.96 10.40 195.40 
2008 532 46.14 6.91 182.69 
2009 429 55.18 8.74 185.12 
2010 424 58.00 10.40 208.57 
2011 405 58.74 7.36 207.87 
2012 395 59.12 10.93 208.89 
2013 333 59.79 11.56 217.14 
All 3,452 55.38 9.57 199.10 
     
 
 
Panel B. Firms with Positive Rank Correlation 
Year Obs. 
Average director 
incentives 
(% of total pay) 
Average market cap 
(billions 2013 $US) 
Average director  
total pay 
(thousands 2013 $US) 
     
2006 827 48.88 10.75 196.34 
2007 1,060 49.66 9.37 191.98 
2008 990 49.57 5.40 186.47 
2009 738 47.83 7.43 185.28 
2010 675 48.96 9.46 194.85 
2011 689 50.62 9.91 200.44 
2012 698 50.27 10.41 201.17 
2013 659 50.57 13.43 201.11 
All 6,336 49.52 9.31 194.10 
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 Table 3.4 - Contingency Analysis 
This table presents contingency analysis based on firm classification and incentive alignment 
structure to examine the persistence of firm compensation strategy. Panel A compares firm 
incentive structure classification year-over-year changes for the full sample. Panel B compares 
Spearman rank correlation classification year-over-year changes for the sub-sample of firm-years 
with variable incentive structures. Because two years of data are necessary for these 
comparisons, the sample spans from 2006-2012 in these tables. Individual sub-class frequency 
and percentage of totals are given in the tables. Results of chi-square test for independence listed 
below. 
 
Panel A. Firm Incentive Structure Class 
   Class in Year t+1 
Class in Year t Year t Totals  Missing  No Incentives  
Equal 
Incentives  
Variable 
Incentives 
          
No Incentives 790  54  507  81  148 
 6.15%  6.84%  64.18%  10.25%  18.73% 
          
Equal Incentives 3,257  192  70  1,717  1,278 
 25.36%  5.89%  2.15%  52.72%  39.24% 
          
Variable Incentives 8,796  443  141  1,620  6,592 
 68.49%  5.04%  1.60%  18.42%  74.94% 
          
Year t+1 Totals 12,843  689  718  3,418  8,018 
 100.00%  5.36%  5.59%  26.61%  62.43% 
          
Chi-square 7,054         
p-value 0.00         
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 Panel B. Spearman Rank Correlation Class 
   Spearman Rank Correlation Year t+1 
Spearman Rank 
Correlation Year t 
Year t 
Totals  Missing  Correlation > 0  Correlation <= 0 
        
Correlation > 0 5,677  278  3,255  2,144 
 64.54%  4.90%  57.34%  37.77% 
        
Correlation <= 0 3,119  165  895  2,059 
 35.46%  5.29%  28.70%  66.01% 
        
Year t+1 Totals 8,796  443  4,150  4,203 
 100.00%  5.04%  47.18%  47.78% 
        
Chi-square 687       
p-value 0.00       
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 Table 3.5 - Test Sample Descriptive Statistics 
The test sample originates with the base sample of 14,464 firm-year observations.  Requiring full Compustat data items reduces this 
sample to 14,459 firm-year observations.  This sample is used to identify all SDC listed acquisitions that occurred during the fiscal 
year for these observations.  We use CRSP data to calculate the cumulative abnormal return (market adjusted) for each acquisition.  
This requires that bidder firms have at least 100 observations in the -210 to -11 day window leading up the announcement date of the 
acquisition.  Our final testing sample contains 2,239 acquisitions filtered on the following criteria: the acquisition must have 
completed, the deal value must be at least $1m as listed in SDC and at least 1% of bidder end of year market capitalization, bidding 
firms must control less than 50% of the target’s shares prior to the acquisition, and bidders must own 100% of the target firm 
following the acquisition.  Panel A reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of the variables measuring board size, market 
capitalization, average director total compensation, and the average percentage of total pay that is due to incentive compensation.  
Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of firm-year observations in which board members did not receive any 
incentive compensation.  Incentive compensation is defined as the sum of the value of restricted stock, option, and non-equity 
incentive compensation as reported in Execucomp.  Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of firm-years in which all 
directors receive identical positive values of incentive compensation for that firm-year.  Panel D reports descriptive statistics for the 
sub-sample of firm-years in which directors receive variable positive values of incentive compensation for that firm-year.  All dollar 
amounts are in 2013 U.S. dollars. 
 
Panel A. Full Test Sample 
   Board size  
Market cap 
(billions 2013 $US)  
Average director total pay 
(thousands 2013 $US)  
Average director 
incentives (% of total pay) 
                  
Year Obs.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev. 
                  
2006 288 
 
8.29 8.00 2.89 
 
10.31 2.47 28.73 
 
189.68 153.31 192.63 
 
49.28 50.11 22.80 
2007 396 
 
8.15 8.00 2.84 
 
10.56 1.69 33.56 
 
190.45 156.86 143.90 
 
51.86 54.06 22.49 
2008 306 
 
8.02 8.00 2.66 
 
5.13 1.19 15.13 
 
190.25 174.66 125.73 
 
51.42 52.07 21.77 
2009 177 
 
8.17 8.00 2.60 
 
12.12 1.95 34.95 
 
198.05 178.55 104.00 
 
52.93 55.72 19.03 
2010 274 
 
8.70 9.00 2.61 
 
12.64 2.66 28.12 
 
204.52 194.48 100.70 
 
51.16 52.87 20.03 
2011 284 
 
8.15 8.00 2.66 
 
8.06 1.93 23.09 
 
202.24 194.50 120.79 
 
52.88 53.89 17.64 
2012 284 
 
8.27 8.00 2.38 
 
6.03 1.74 12.63 
 
197.63 185.38 93.90 
 
53.30 52.37 16.71 
2013 230 
 
8.53 8.00 2.64 
 
8.21 2.33 25.79 
 
190.82 185.91 91.06 
 
52.19 53.47 18.07 
All 2,239   8.28 8.00 2.68 
 
9.03 1.91 26.28 
 
195.09 178.55 128.43 
 
51.81 53.07 20.18 
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 Panel B. No Incentive Test Sample 
   Board size  
Market cap 
(billions 2013 $US)  
Average director total pay 
(thousands 2013 $US)   
                  
Year Obs.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.     
                  
2006 11 
 
7.09 6.00 3.33 
 
3.88 1.15 7.80 
 
122.14 59.51 177.48     
2007 18 
 
8.94 8.50 3.28 
 
2.05 1.17 3.17 
 
85.07 67.05 60.20     
2008 10 
 
8.30 8.00 2.45 
 
2.58 1.13 3.53 
 
114.41 79.70 78.84     
2009 3 
 
8.33 9.00 2.08 
 
57.12 3.92 95.33 
 
74.61 39.07 92.98     
2010 17 
 
9.76 10.00 2.31 
 
6.19 0.48 15.66 
 
106.77 40.42 86.84     
2011 8 
 
8.25 8.50 1.83 
 
26.95 2.12 68.25 
 
94.11 70.51 70.86     
2012 5 
 
8.80 9.00 4.32 
 
1.06 1.34 0.49 
 
123.69 123.41 80.47     
2013 9 
 
9.44 9.00 3.09 
 
23.39 1.72 65.40 
 
110.09 86.44 84.85     
All 81   8.74 9.00 2.90   10.04 1.22 35.90   103.95 69.88 93.95     
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 Panel C. Equal Dollar Incentive Test Sample 
   Board size  
Market cap 
(billions 2013 $US)  
Average director total pay 
(thousands 2013 $US)  
Average director 
incentives (% of total pay) 
                  
Year Obs.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev. 
                  
2006 41 
 
7.05 7.00 2.59 
 
5.53 1.93 8.02 
 
187.96 166.70 116.58 
 
47.20 46.61 21.20 
2007 60 
 
6.50 6.00 1.93 
 
8.79 1.87 24.09 
 
204.25 167.83 153.90 
 
54.53 54.63 20.23 
2008 44 
 
7.16 6.50 2.87 
 
9.03 0.89 27.68 
 
220.10 181.66 227.00 
 
49.67 47.84 24.20 
2009 66 
 
7.11 7.00 2.01 
 
5.29 1.71 10.09 
 
190.59 186.67 88.28 
 
53.88 56.18 18.03 
2010 94 
 
7.60 7.00 2.53 
 
9.39 2.14 15.90 
 
212.02 198.81 89.83 
 
56.57 54.44 12.93 
2011 98 
 
6.71 6.00 2.47 
 
7.11 1.58 22.85 
 
198.88 191.69 98.16 
 
54.85 54.49 14.13 
2012 85 
 
7.00 7.00 2.18 
 
5.74 1.59 10.11 
 
201.38 187.08 98.28 
 
55.06 55.05 15.03 
2013 82 
 
7.59 7.00 1.90 
 
5.66 2.82 8.10 
 
206.18 199.32 78.11 
 
54.33 54.03 12.75 
All 570   7.11 7.00 2.32 
 
7.07 1.88 17.08 
 
202.93 187.79 116.31 
 
53.99 54.18 16.72 
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 Panel D. Variable Dollar Incentive Test Sample 
   Board size  
Market cap 
(billions 2013 $US)  
Average director total pay 
(thousands 2013 $US)  
Average director 
incentives (% of total pay) 
                  
Year Obs.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev.  Mean Median Std. dev. 
                  
2006 236 
 
8.56 8.00 2.86 
 
11.44 2.66 31.42 
 
193.13 153.31 203.56 
 
51.94 51.30 20.90 
2007 318 
 
8.42 8.00 2.86 
 
11.37 1.71 35.91 
 
193.81 160.94 143.25 
 
54.29 55.72 19.85 
2008 252 
 
8.16 8.00 2.62 
 
4.55 1.21 11.97 
 
188.04 174.66 98.83 
 
53.77 53.53 19.08 
2009 108 
 
8.81 8.50 2.73 
 
15.05 2.60 41.03 
 
206.04 182.00 111.22 
 
53.82 56.25 17.83 
2010 163 
 
9.23 9.00 2.49 
 
15.19 3.07 33.85 
 
210.39 196.31 103.16 
 
53.37 52.87 16.83 
2011 178 
 
8.94 9.00 2.47 
 
7.73 2.08 19.11 
 
208.96 198.92 131.41 
 
54.17 54.93 16.06 
2012 194 
 
8.81 9.00 2.21 
 
6.29 1.85 13.74 
 
197.90 185.62 91.88 
 
53.91 52.01 15.35 
2013 139 
 
9.04 8.00 2.83 
 
8.73 2.22 28.24 
 
186.98 182.62 95.82 
 
54.30 54.17 16.17 
All 1,588   8.67 8.00 2.67 
 
9.68 1.99 28.32 
 
196.93 179.40 132.35 
 
53.67 53.74 18.22 
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 Table 3.6 - Annual distribution of rank correlations for acquisitions by variable incentive firms  
This table reports the annual distribution of the Spearman rank correlation between cash 
compensation and incentive compensation for directors within each firm-year observation.  Rank 
correlations are zero for all firm-years in which firms either did not grant any director incentives 
or all directors received identical values of incentives, and thus only variable incentive structure 
firms are presented.  
 
Year Obs. 5th pctl 25th pctl 50th pctl 75th pctl 95th pctl Mean 
        
2006 236 -0.74 -0.05 0.30 0.60 0.85 0.23 
2007 318 -0.73 -0.05 0.37 0.65 0.87 0.25 
2008 252 -0.80 -0.34 0.24 0.65 0.86 0.15 
2009 108 -0.82 -0.48 0.15 0.61 0.86 0.11 
2010 163 -0.82 -0.27 0.30 0.58 0.78 0.13 
2011 178 -0.78 -0.21 0.49 0.68 0.89 0.25 
2012 194 -0.77 -0.14 0.45 0.64 0.83 0.24 
2013 139 -0.74 -0.21 0.46 0.61 0.90 0.24 
All 1,588 -0.77 -0.17 0.37 0.62 0.86 0.21 
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 Table 3.7 - Comparison correlations for acquisitions by variable incentive firms 
Starting with the sub-sample of firm-years with variable incentive compensation structures, we 
classify firms based on their Spearman rank correlation.  There are 536 acquisitions by firms 
with a Spearman rank correlation that is less than or equal to zero, and there are 1,052 
acquisition by firms with positive Spearman rank correlations. This table provides annual 
averages of incentive percentage of total pay, market capitalization, and total director 
compensation for the acquisitions in each of these sub-samples. All dollar values are in 2013 
U.S. dollars. 
 
Panel A. Acquisitions by Firms with Zero or Negative Rank Correlation 
Year Obs. 
Average director 
incentives 
(% of total pay) 
Average market cap 
(billions 2013 $US) 
Average director  
total pay  
(thousands 2013 $US) 
     
2006 73 60.96 13.03 215.33 
2007 95 56.12 13.65 198.44 
2008 97 54.10 4.75 167.74 
2009 43 58.34 20.50 199.48 
2010 63 57.76 20.86 221.53 
2011 56 60.48 6.45 210.63 
2012 63 62.29 5.01 210.74 
2013 46 62.64 10.60 195.74 
All 536 58.53 11.32 200.47 
     
 
 
Panel B. Acquisitions by Firms with Positive Rank Correlation 
Year Obs. 
Average director 
incentives 
(% of total pay) 
Average market cap 
(billions 2013 $US) 
Average director  
total pay 
(thousands 2013 $US) 
     
2006 163 47.91 10.72 183.19 
2007 223 53.51 10.40 191.83 
2008 155 53.55 4.43 200.75 
2009 65 50.83 11.44 210.38 
2010 100 50.61 11.62 203.36 
2011 122 51.27 8.31 208.19 
2012 131 49.88 6.90 191.73 
2013 93 50.17 7.81 182.66 
All 1,052 51.20 8.84 195.12 
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 Table 3.8 - Summary statistics for test sample 
The test sample contains 2,239 acquisitions made between 2006 and 2013 by firms in our base 
sample. This table presents the mean, median, and standard deviation of the variables used in our 
regression analysis. We use dummy variables to indicate a bidder firm’s board compensation 
strategy as equal incentive, variable incentive, or no incentive. We include the natural log of the 
average director pay for the bidding firm, the coefficient of variation of total pay within the 
board of the bidding firm, the average percentage of total pay that is due to incentives for 
directors of the bidding firm, and the Spearman rank correlation between cash compensation and 
incentive compensation within the board of the bidding firm. To control for firm factors, we 
calculate the board size as the number of directors listed in Execucomp for the firm-year of the 
acquisition. We also include the market capital, calculated as the year end common stock price 
time shares outstanding from Compustat, as well as Tobin’s q, free cash flow as a percentage of 
total assets, leverage, and the stock price runup during a 200 day window [-210,-11] prior to the 
acquisition. We additionally control for the deal characteristics of the acquisition, including the 
relative deal size, dummy indicators for high-tech industry firms, target status as public, private, 
or subsidiary, and dummy indicators for all-cash or partial stock acquisitions. Variable 
definitions can be found in the appendix. All variables have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile with the exception of the dependent variable (CAR), dummy variables, the Spearman 
correlations, and the average incentive percentage of pay for bidder directors.  
 
Variable   Mean Median Std. dev. 
     
Compensation Characteristics     
Equal incentives (dummy)  0.255 0 0.436 
No incentives (dummy)  0.036 0 0.187 
Log director pay  5.109 5.185 0.578 
Director pay coefficient of variation  0.300 0.241 0.282 
Average incentive pct. of pay  51.813 53.075 20.184 
Spearman rank correlation  0.147 0.000 0.454 
     
Bidder Characteristics     
Board size  8.275 8.000 2.683 
Log market capitalization  7.739 7.556 1.516 
CAR [-2,+2] (%)  0.956 0.709 6.709 
CAR [-5,+5] (%)  0.998 0.652 8.701 
Tobin's q  1.726 1.490 0.861 
Free cash flow (% of total assets)  4.316 4.940 6.841 
Leverage (%)  15.842 13.314 13.278 
Stock price runup (%)  -0.013 0.000 0.206 
     
  
113 
 
 Variable   Mean Median Std. dev. 
     
Deal Characteristics     
Relative deal size  0.150 0.060 0.275 
High tech (dummy)  0.358 0 0.479 
Public target (dummy)  0.339 0 0.474 
Private target (dummy)  0.578 1 0.494 
Subsidiary Target (dummy)  0.078 0 0.268 
All-cash deal (dummy)  0.563 1 0.496 
Stock deal (dummy)   0.205 0 0.404 
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 Table 3.9 - Regression Analysis - 5 Day Window 
This table presents the result of our main regressions.  The test sample contains 2,239 
acquisitions by firms for which we have full director compensation, bidder financial, acquisition, 
and bidder return information from Execucomp, Compustat, SDC, and CRSP. All regressions 
use the 5-day cumulative abnormal (market adjusted) return as the dependent variable. 
Regression (1) includes only firm compensation strategy classification variables as independent 
variables, while Regression (2) adds a larger set of compensation based explanatory factors. 
Regressions (3) and (4) include our full set of bidder and deal characteristic control variables.  
Regression (5) contains results from a robustness test utilizing multi-year firm classification 
dummy variables.  The reported p-values (in parenthesis below coefficients) based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. Observation, adjusted R-squared values, and 
other regression detail can be found below each model.  
 
Dependent variable: CAR [-2,+2] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Compensation Characteristics      
Equal incentives (dummy) 0.975 1.079 0.824 0.963  
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.023) (0.013)  
No incentives (dummy) 0.095 -0.063 0.073 -0.185  
 (0.875) (0.933) (0.903) (0.804)  
Equal incentives (either year)     0.961 
     (0.012) 
No incentives (both years)     0.693 
     (0.555) 
Variable incentives to no incentives     -0.445 
     (0.710) 
No incentives to variable incentives     2.339 
     (0.145) 
Log director pay  -0.836  -0.688 -0.868 
  (0.007)  (0.054) (0.047) 
Director pay coefficient of variation  0.663  0.902 1.035 
  (0.253)  (0.113) (0.104) 
Average incentive pct. of pay  0.010  0.004 0.013 
  (0.289)  (0.689) (0.298) 
Spearman rank correlation  -0.440  -0.428 -0.537 
  (0.194)  (0.198) (0.157) 
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 Dependent variable: CAR [-2,+2] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Bidder Characteristics      
Board size   -0.024 -0.050 -0.053 
   (0.687) (0.411) (0.461) 
Log market capitalization   -0.333 -0.160 -0.152 
   (0.003) (0.226) (0.340) 
Tobin's q   0.422 0.400 0.444 
   (0.058) (0.073) (0.143) 
Free cash flow (% of total assets)   0.021 0.019 0.021 
   (0.448) (0.500) (0.533) 
Leverage (%)   0.023 0.022 0.027 
   (0.084) (0.092) (0.062) 
Stock price runup (%)   0.332 0.253 -2.087 
   (0.467) (0.599) (0.093) 
      
Deal Characteristics      
Relative deal size   0.423 0.607 0.481 
   (0.664) (0.532) (0.620) 
High tech (dummy)   -0.516 -0.462 -0.690 
   (0.115) (0.171) (0.080) 
High tech x relative deal size   -4.062 -4.152 -2.842 
   (0.020) (0.017) (0.185) 
Public target x all-cash deal   0.328 0.329 0.335 
   (0.457) (0.454) (0.505) 
Public target x stock deal   -2.308 -2.477 -2.523 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Private target x all-cash deal   -0.661 -0.637 -0.532 
   (0.064) (0.073) (0.179) 
Private target x stock deal   0.310 0.159 0.223 
   (0.642) (0.813) (0.775) 
Subsidiary target x all-cash deal   1.091 1.092 0.972 
   (0.060) (0.061) (0.108) 
Intercept 1.765 5.385 4.021 6.011 6.128 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
      
Number of obs. 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 1,834 
Adjusted-R squared 0.41% 0.72% 3.60% 3.73% 3.47% 
Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year Year 
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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 Table 3.10 - Regression Analysis - 11 Day Window 
The test sample contains 2,239 acquisitions by firms for which we have full director 
compensation, bidder financial, acquisition, and bidder return information from Execucomp, 
Compustat, SDC, and CRSP. All regressions use the 11-day cumulative abnormal (market 
adjusted) return as the dependent variable. Regression (1) includes only firm compensation 
strategy classification variables as independent variables, while Regression (2) adds a larger set 
of compensation based explanatory factors. Regressions (3) and (4) include our full set of bidder 
and deal characteristic control variables. Regression (5) contains results from a robustness test 
utilizing multi-year firm classification dummy variables.  The reported p-values (in parenthesis 
below coefficients) based on robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
Observation, adjusted R-squared values, and other regression detail can be found below each 
model.  
 
Dependent variable: CAR [-5,+5] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Compensation Characteristics      
Equal incentives (dummy) 1.345 1.441 1.224 1.400  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)  
No incentives (dummy) 0.616 0.896 0.481 0.696  
 (0.459) (0.403) (0.554) (0.507)  
Equal incentives (either year)     1.299 
     (0.008) 
No incentives (either year)     0.258 
     (0.862) 
Variable incentives to no incentives     0.239 
     (0.890) 
No incentives to variable incentives     3.377 
     (0.029) 
Log director pay  -1.535  -1.570 -1.710 
  (0.000)  (0.003) (0.005) 
Director pay coefficient of variation  0.405  0.705 0.694 
  (0.597)  (0.372) (0.448) 
Average incentive pct. of pay  0.027  0.023 0.030 
  (0.036)  (0.095) (0.072) 
Spearman rank correlation  -0.265  -0.284 -0.270 
  (0.510)  (0.473) (0.549) 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
 Dependent variable: CAR [-5,+5] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Bidder Characteristics      
Board size   -0.027 -0.048 -0.079 
   (0.735) (0.553) (0.413) 
Log market capitalization   -0.340 -0.012 0.151 
   (0.047) (0.954) (0.534) 
Tobin's q   0.291 0.217 -0.003 
   (0.330) (0.475) (0.994) 
Free cash flow (% of total assets)   0.029 0.025 0.026 
   (0.456) (0.516) (0.551) 
Leverage (%)   -0.011 -0.010 -0.002 
   (0.520) (0.566) (0.925) 
Stock price runup (%)   0.616 0.490 -3.287 
   (0.425) (0.552) (0.138) 
      
Deal Characteristics      
Relative deal size)   1.524 1.823 1.675 
   (0.136) (0.077) (0.097) 
High tech (dummy)   -0.649 -0.564 -0.774 
   (0.133) (0.202) (0.126) 
High tech x relative deal size   -5.585 -5.752 -3.962 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.042) 
Public target x all-cash deal   -0.263 -0.294 -0.086 
   (0.673) (0.636) (0.905) 
Public target x stock deal   -2.194 -2.441 -2.547 
   (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Private target x all-cash deal   -0.644 -0.608 -0.353 
   (0.177) (0.200) (0.508) 
Private target x stock deal   0.195 -0.082 0.222 
   (0.802) (0.918) (0.811) 
Subsidiary target x all-cash deal   1.470 1.482 1.217 
   (0.065) (0.063) (0.149) 
Intercept 1.084 7.421 4.142 8.475 7.800 
 (0.036) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) 
      
Number of obs. 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 1,834 
Adjusted-R squared 0.22% 0.83% 2.29% 2.65% 1.83% 
Fixed Effects Year Year Year Year Year 
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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